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Abstract 
The German transition to renewable energies has so far been an example of a successful energy transition 
of a major economy. Even though this transition is criticized for being only a half-hearted solution, it is an 
important example of the attempt of a major economy to transit towards renewable energies and is 
therefore worth studying in its own rights. Thus, my aim in this thesis is the identification of obstacles on 
the pathway towards renewable energies to contribute to a more stable transition to a fossil free economy, 
as one of the most urgent issues of our time. This research is relevant to the broader question, of whether 
it could be a suitable strategy to reform the energy sector without reforming related sectors such as the FS. 
Focusing on the financial basis of the renewable energy transition, I claim that the German transition is at 
risk, as its financing relies on the unstable financial system. Private capital sources are expected to finance 
most of the necessary investment in renewable energies. Those capital sources, however, are volatile and 
instable, as described by Minsky’s instability hypothesis, which was supported by the strong evidence of 
the latest financial crisis. 
I analyse the financial basis of the German energy transition from a structural as well as a discursive 
dimension. Both dimensions are consistently embraced by the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, as 
developed by Fairclough, which I apply in my research. I use offshore wind energy as a case which allows 
me to conduct an in depth problem analysis. My structural analysis clearly showed strong financial linkages 
between the financial system and key companies operative in the energy transition. Standing on the 
shoulders of Minsky’s instability hypothesis, I follow that those linkages destabilize the energy transition. 
My discursive analysis pointed to a lack of problem awareness amongst the key agents of the energy 
transition. Thus, also the importance of risk mitigation is hardly emphasized in their discourse. 
The problem of financial instability of the German transition to renewable energies demands a problem 
awareness that results in further research and ultimately structural changes. Acknowledging the 
interconnectedness between the energy and the financial system is a first step in finding holistic problem 
solutions. On this note, my research puts sustainability into a new light: By tackling sustainability problems, 
all connected systems can be changed for a better. It is time to end thinking in trade-offs. 
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Prologue 
“We need to remember. […] The passing of one crisis seems merely to be the prelude to the next”(McNally, 
2011, p. 2) This statement is true for sustainability crises as well as for financial crises. Humanity has solved 
manifold sustainability challenges in the past, but every solution had its own drawbacks The agricultural 
revolution led, amongst others, to monocultures and the industrial revolution resulted in climate change 
(Becker, 2014). The same can be said for financial crises. Every boom sows the seeds for the next crisis 
(Minsky, 1986). Solving sustainability and financial challenges can only be successful, if failures of the past 
are not repeated. We need to remember. 
At the same time our world is getting more complex and interconnected (Heylighen, Cilliers, & 
Gershenson, 2006). Solving challenges with silo thinking cannot be successful. It is time for holistic 
approaches that tackle more than one challenge and take systemic complexity into account. Thus, the 
connections between different elements of our socio-environmental system need to be uncovered. 
The need to remember and to discover connections brings me to the idea of my thesis: Partly I base my 
thesis on my experiences before I started LUMES, which I revisited and interpreted in a new light through 
the lens of sustainability that LUMES equipped me with. More concretely: Before I started my studies of 
sustainability science I was a banker and an auditor for financial institutions. I started to work in the 
financial system just in 2008, i.e. in the middle of the latest financial crisis and my first employer is now 
liquidated. I have experienced myself what severe liquidity shortages mean for financial institutions and 
how institutions are affected by systemic market failures. At the first glance one might ask how these 
experiences are related to sustainability challenges. At the second glance, it seems naturally and necessary 
to see the connections between the financial system and sustainability challenges and to remember the 
occurrences of the latest financial crises. One example is the German transition towards renewable 
energies that draws financial capital from the financial system. If financial crises result in liquidity 
shortages, the renewable energy transition is left high and dry. This connection will be focus of my thesis. 
Considering my work within the financial system and my studies of Sustainability Science, my thesis is a 
very personal work, summing up experiences I made in the last years of my life. I tried to remember these 
experiences and connect them to each other to deliver a valuable contribution to the journey of our society 
towards sustainability. 
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1 Introduction 
At the heart of Germany’s sustainability policy is the so-called “Energiewende”, which is to be understood 
as the transition from fossil energy and nuclear energy sources towards renewable energies (“RE”) along 
with increases in energy efficiency to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions (Fischer, Hake, 
Kuckshinrichs, Schröder, & Venghaus, 2016). The Energiewende is criticized for relying upon the assumption 
that neoliberalism can deliver a technolgical fix for every problem (Harvey, 2005), as well as for being a 
half-hearted solution within the paradigm of ecological modernization (e.g. Buschmann, 2013; Christoff, 
1996; Dryzek, 2013). Nevertheless, the Energiewende is an important example of the attempt of a major 
economy1 to transition towards RE and is therefore worth studying in its own rights. 
The Energiewende is at risk, as it relies on the unstable financial system (“FS”). The German government 
has estimated that the Energiewende requires investments of EUR 550 Billion until 2050 (German 
Government, 2017b). Private and institutional capital sources (e.g. from banks, insurances and pensions 
funds) are expected to finance most of the necessary investment (Gatzert & Kosub, 2016; Newell, 2011). 
The recent financial crisis, translated into an economic crisis, has once again proven the instability of the 
private capital sources. Although it originated in the United States, the financial crisis caused substantial 
governmental expenditures in Germany (Greive, 2013; Rüdiger Jungbluth & Heuser, 2011) and led to the 
collapse of major banks. 
My aim is to contribute to a stable energy transition to reach a fossil free economy. I claim that the 
stability of the Energiewende is currently threatened by its dependency upon the instable FS. I arrive at 
this claim by analysing the financial structure of the Energiewende through the lens of Minsky’s instability 
hypothesis (see chapter 2.2). As a post-Keynesian, Minsky builds his theory upon market psychology. He 
hypothesizes that the optimism of investors and banks towards future cash flows leads to overinvestments 
based on debt. If assets can’t generate the cash flows needed to pay interest and redeem loans, banks have 
to carry losses from loan impairment, potentially leading to financial crises that likely infect the real 
economy. In every boom lie the seeds for the next bust (Minsky, 1989; Minsky & Whalen, 1996). 
I do not aim to test Minsky’s theory. Rather I base my thesis on the assumption of Minsky’s instability 
hypothesis and use Minsky’s theory to analyse the financial (in-) stability of the Energiewende. Minsky’s 
theory was supported by the evidence of the latest financial crisis, which lead to a credit crunch, the 
                                                             
1  Germany is the fourth biggest economy of the world, contributing 4.5 % of the world’s GDP (World Bank, 2017). 
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downturn of investments, and ultimately translated into an economic crisis. This turn of events puts a 
question mark on many neoclassical economic theories, classical neoliberalism (McNally, 2011; Nowicki, 
2012; Radonjić & Zec, 2010), and mainstreamed Minsky’s instability hypothesis (e.g. Charles, 2016; 
Christophers, 2017; Gemici, 2016; The Economist, 2016; Wolf, 2017).  
The potential risks emerging from the financial structures might be offset by awareness of the designers of 
the Energiewende. Awareness is a discursive element that is in a dialectical relationship with the structures 
of the Energiewende, as I will explain in depth during the course of my thesis. I will analyse not only the 
structures, but also the discursive awareness of the agents of the Energiewende. 
On the basis of those considerations I support my claim by answering the following research questions 
(“RQs”): 
1. Are companies of the Energiewende structurally dependent on the FS and if so, how? 
2. If companies are dependent on the FS, to which degree are the agents of the Energiewende aware 
of the risk emerging from financial instability? 
3. If agents are aware, do they emphasize the importance of risk mitigation and if so, how? 
The Energiewende is at risk when the above factors converge. In other words, when companies structurally 
depend on the FS, the agents of the Energiewende are not aware of this dependency, don’t emphasize the 
importance of risk mitigation in their discourse and consequently do not take structural risk mitigation 
measures. As shown by my RQs, I engage in a dialectical dialogue between structure and discourse. The 
structural linkages might influence the awareness of key agents of the Energiewende. But their awareness 
and emphasis on risk mitigation might again shape the structural linkages and mitigate instability arising 
from structures. This brings me to the research paradigm of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979) and the 
methodology of critical discourse analysis (“CDA”, Fairclough, 1992, 2001; Fairclough, 2010), as will 
become clearer during the course of my thesis. 
For my analysis I choose a case study approach (see chapter 2.4), as this allows me to conduct an extensive 
problem analysis within a feasible scope for this thesis. The case of offshore wind energy in Germany is 
suitable to answer my RQs. This is, because offshore wind energy demands significant financing due to its 
capital intensity, involved complexity and risk, and the project maturity (Dedecca, Hakvoort, & Ortt, 2016; 
Gatzert & Kosub, 2016). Financial linkages are more easily identifiable than for example in the solar power 
sector, where smaller project scales allow financing by private persons. Offshore wind energy can therefore 
serve as an example of the implementation of big RE projects, comparable to large-scale bioenergy or 
hydropower projects or installation of large grid systems. The main agents are the German government as 
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the designer of the Energiewende, and the companies that own offshore wind energy parks. I will focus in 
my analysis on these two agents groups. 
 
1.1 Research aim 
The financial crisis has raised questions as to whether the FS can address issues related to climate change 
(Newell, 2011). Nevertheless, the financing of the Energiewende is based on the FS. I aim to increase the 
stability of the RE transition to contribute to the transition to a fossil free economy to ultimately tackle 
climate change. In order to do so, I will assess whether the FS is a stable ground for a transition to RE. 
This is relevant to the broader question, of whether it could be a suitable strategy to reform the energy 
sector without reforming related sectors such as the FS.  
The research aim is not only relevant for the German Energiewende, but for all energy transitions. Although 
I agree with the mentioned critique of the Energiewende, it is nevertheless a case that can deliver valuable 
insights into obstacles on the pathway of major economies to RE.  
 
1.2 Contribution to Sustainability Science  
With my thesis I contribute to Sustainability Science in three ways: 
Firstly, I will explore the use of CDA for the analysis of complex sustainability problems. CDA is 
interdisciplinary as it creates a dialogue between different theories and methodologies through its dialectic 
approach (Fairclough, 1992). I will study financial structures as well as discourses that give meaning to 
those structures. As I draw my methods from different disciplines (i.e. economics, social science, 
linguistics), my research emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinarity in tackling sustainability 
problems. 
Secondly, my research aims to contribute to tackle climate change, as one of the key sustainability 
problems (Rockstrom et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). I will contribute to the success of RE transitions of 
developed economies by identifying obstacles that need to be addressed within this transition. By 
analysing whether the transition towards RE is possible by reforming solely the energy system, I investigate 
the interconnectedness of our socio-economic system. This investigation contributes to one of the core 
questions of Sustainability Science, i.e. how human environmental systems can be managed to reach a 
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transition towards sustainability (Kates, 2011) and to the debate about the possibility of reaching 
sustainability through reforms of the current neoliberal economy (Newell, 2011). 
Thirdly, I point out how addressing sustainability issues, i.e. in this case the transition to RE, impacts related 
social systems, i.e. in this case the FS. Sustainability and financial interests are aligned. This angle puts 
sustainability into a new light. The pursuit of sustainability is not inherently in conflict with other 
development goals, but can potentially contribute to them. This point will become clearer during the 
course of my thesis. 
 
1.3 Structure 
After introducing the theoretical and methodological underpinning I will structure my thesis according to 
the RQs. To assess whether companies of the Energiewende are structurally dependent on the FS (RQ1), I 
will firstly conduct a literature review to identify evidence for the structural risks in the academic debate 
(chapter 3). Secondly, I will analyse financial linkages of cases of key companies (chapter 3). If companies 
depend on the FS, I will assess the degree of the awareness of key agents of the Energiewende regarding 
the risks emerging from financial instability (RQ2) and how the importance of risk mitigation measures is 
framed (RQ3; chapter 4). Bringing structure and discourse ultimately together, allows me to define the 
problem of the dependency of the energy transition upon the FS. On this basis I will discuss which 
obstacles hinder the problem-solving, who benefits from the current dependency, possible problem 
solutions, and the limitations of my research (chapter 5). I will end my thesis with a conclusion (chapter 6). 
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2 Theoretical foundation & research design 
2.1 Financialization and Minsky 
“Neoliberalization has meant, in short, the financialization of everything. This deepened the hold of finance 
over all other areas of the economy…” (Harvey, 2005, p. 1). It is therefore crucial to understand the 
dynamics of financialization and its impact on the economy to solve sustainability problems. 
Fetishization of money: In Neoliberalism the purpose of all actions follows the maxim of increasing profits 
in a manner of instrumental rationality (Weber, 1905). Although not a commodity, money is commodified 
and traded on financial markets, increasing the likelihood of investment shortages for businesses (Polanyi, 
1944). If everything is financialized, then everything is built on the ground of the FS, which is prone to crises 
as described by Marx, Keynes and more specifically by Minsky. If this ground breaks, then everything that 
rests on it likely falls apart as well. Minsky and Whalen define the power of financial institutions over the 
economy as Money-Manager Capitalism (1989). Minsky’s theory gives answer to the question why FS are 
an instable ground. As this theory builds the backbone and the underlying assumption of my thesis, I will 
introduce it within the next paragraphs.  
Phases of market upswings sow the seeds for the next crisis as optimism leads to an understatement of 
risks and to excessive debt financed growth (Minsky, 1986). Due to their willingness to release more credit 
during optimistic phases, financial institutions play a procyclical role in business cycles (Prates & Farhi, 
2015). If loans are available at low interest rates and market liquidity is high, then companies are 
encouraged to grow financed by debts. Their leverage ratios2, interest sensitivities,3 and bankruptcy risks 
rise and debt exceeds the capital service border of companies. If assets don’t deliver the estimated cash 
flows, then companies can’t serve their liabilities and financial institutions face losses, which incurs the risk 
of credit crunches and economic crises (Minsky & Whalen, 1996). New financial innovations, such as 
securitization4, lead to further debt expenditure and in the latest crisis rating agencies increased optimism 
further by optimistic ratings (Prates & Farhi, 2015). 
                                                             
2  Leverage ratio indicates how much of the assets of a company are financed by debt. 
3  Interest sensitivity indicates the increase of interest expenditures of a company if interest rates increase. 
4  Securitization describes in short the issuing of financial instruments that reference on a pool of underlying financial 
instruments, such as loans. Massive defaults of securities initiated the latest financial crisis. 
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Financial discipline within one sector alone is not sufficient risk mitigation for the described instability 
dynamics. This is, because the FS is the junction that connects all economic sectors with each other. Crises 
can spread along financial linkages and through the FS easily from one sector to the whole economic 
system (Minsky, 1986). The latest financial regulation (in the EU mainly Basel III5), has so far not been 
successful in stabilizing the banking sector (Aymanns, Caccioli, Farmer, & Tan, 2016; Schwerter, 2011). 
Structural Keynesians and new-Marxists criticize that Minsky’s instability hypothesis does not take the 
whole picture into account by focusing mainly on the FS (Palley, 2010). They claim that the Neoliberal 
growth model is the underlying driver of crises (Palley, 2010). The existence of financial linkages and 
financial instability, which can lead to liquidity shortages in the economy, is not questioned. Thus this 
critique is less relevant for my research, which focuses primarily on instability of the RE transition due to 
financial instability and only secondarily on the cause of this instability. 
 
2.2 Potential instability of energy transitions 
On the basis of Minsky’s theory of Money Manager Capitalism, I build a theoretical model that underlies 
my thesis (figure 1). I identify the government and key companies implementing the energy transition as 
key agents and sources of social power in the case of offshore wind energy. Due to the large project scale 
of offshore wind energy, the financial capability of civil society is likely exceeded and civil society is not 
considered in this model. 
                                                             
5  Basel III is an international framework for financial regulation, which is transferred into mandatory EU law. 
Amongst others, Basel III entails higher capital requirements for financial institutions, anticyclical mechanisms (i.e. 
mechanisms which shall even out market booms and busts), and shall minimize off-balance sheet activities of 
banks). 
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Figure 1. Model of instability (own figure) 
Instability of energy transitions can originate in two different ways: Firstly, by excessive debt of the RE 
sector itself, or secondly by excessive debt of other sectors. Both mechanisms have the potential to 
destabilize the FS, which might lead to credit crunches that limit the capital supply for energy transition. 
Knowing and being aware of the described instability mechanisms is the first step towards risk mitigation. 
Companies can potentially decrease their own dependency upon the FS, or prepare for phases of market 
distortions. The government can regulate the FS as well as the energy system and align and harmonize the 
politics of the two resorts. 
The model underlying my thesis considers both, material structures as well as social processes shaping 
these structures. This brings me to my ontology and epistemology. 
 
2.3 Epistemology, ontology and normative research 
Based on my theoretical model, I acknowledge the need to consider material financial structures as well as 
the discourse of key agents to assess the stability of the RE transition. This approach gives a meaningful role 
to structures as well as to agents. My ontology therefore follows critical realism as developed by Bhaskar 
(Bhaskar, 1975, 1979). Bhaskar acknowledges the existence of a natural, physical world independent from 
human perception and interpretation of it (Benton & Craib, 2011). The human understanding of this 
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physical world, however, is influenced by the social processes of knowledge creation. Especially an 
investigation of social problems can’t be successful without considering the social world that exists in a 
dialectical relation with the natural world. This social world is consists of relationships between social 
agents (Benton & Craib, 2011). 
Agents are constrained by social structures, but are at the same time the condition for the existence of these 
social structures, leading to a meaningful agency (Benton & Craib, 2011), which at the same time does not 
neglect the need for systemic social transformation (Collier, 1994). 
In terms of epistemology, critical realism does not equalize human knowledge about the world and reality 
(Benton & Craib, 2011).Science “can give us real insights into the nature of things” (Collier, 1994, p. ix). The 
surface appearance of the world can nevertheless be misleading. Research must infer from the data 
(Benton & Craib, 2011) and reason in a Hegelian dialectic tradition (Collier, 1994). This inference must 
consider the role of discourses, as social tools to create meaning in non-discursive structures (Fairclough, 
1992). Analysing discourses can create insights into the current interpretation of reality and question this 
interpretation via a self-aware, reflexive process. This allows judging between different interpretations of 
the world, values and discourses. 
Sustainability Science is inherently normative, as it aims to tackle socio-environmental challenges (Kates, 
2011; Lang et al., 2012). Sustainability Science aims to identify social drivers behind environmental 
problems and considers therefore the physical as well as the social world. Identifying challenges and 
problems is closely linked to questions as to which human values shall be preserved and developed through 
the transition in society towards a desired future state (Kates, 2011). Sustainability Science has a problem-
solving dimension (Lang et al., 2012) and aims to tackle problems by linking knowledge to action (Miller, 
2013), as it follows the critical realist idea that knowledge alone does not lead to freedom and 
emancipation (Collier, 1994).  
Considering the general nature of Sustainability Science and the specific problem setting of my thesis, 
critical realism is the most suitable ontology and epistemology to serve the aims of my research. Critical 
realism acknowledges the real challenges in the physical world as well as the importance of the dialectic 
interplay between social structures and agents for the solution of these challenges. All of this plays an 
important role in the problem of stable energy transition discussed in my thesis. 
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2.4 Case introduction 
An analysis of social structures, without tying it to a specific case and considering the impact of agents 
could only remain speculative (Fairclough, 2010). Thus, I will analyse the relationship between the 
Energiewende and the FS using a case study approach. I will draw my conclusions from the concrete 
example of offshore wind energy in Germany. The chosen case is suitable to answer my RQs, as offshore 
wind energy projects need substantial investment. 
German offshore wind energy is produced adjacent to the Wadden Sea, the world’s longest Wadden 
landscape with a unique geology and ecology (Müller et al., 2016; Slob, Geerdink, Röckmann, & Vöge, 
2016). Installations on a commercial scale are planned (figure 2 and 3; Dedecca et al., 2016). High 
uncertainties about environmental impacts are linked to the new offshore technology (Kaldellis, Apostolou, 
Kapsali, & Kondili, 2016; Masden, McCluskie, Owen, & Langston, 2015).  
       
Figure 2. Installed and planned offshore wind 
parks. Yellow = under construction, green = fully 
installed, blue = planned, transparent = cancelled. 
Red area = Wadden Sea protection area (own 
figure, developed in the basis of 4C Offshore, 
2016) 
 Figure 3. Cables running related to offshore wind 
energy (own figure, developed on the basis of 4C 
Offshore, 2016) 
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2.5 Methodology and method selection 
Based on my theoretical model as well as my ontology and epistemology I will divide my research in two 
main parts: (i) structural analysis of the dependence of key companies of the offshore wind energy sector 
on the FS and (ii) analysis of discursive problem awareness of the key agents of the Energiewende. As will 
become clear, I will use a mixed method approach, drawing from quantitative and qualitative methods. I 
will now introduce the methods used for my research. 
 
2.5.1 Design of structural analysis 
I will assess the structural dependence of key companies (RQ1) using the following methods (table 1): 
Table 1. Methods RQ1 (own table) 
Research question Methods Section 
Structural dimension, analysis of the wider social practice 
1:   Are companies of the 
Energiewende 
structurally dependent 
on the FS and if, how? 
 Review of academic literature regarding the 
relationship between the FS and RE transitions, 
to identify evidence for the structural 
dependency available in the academic debate; 
 Identification of key companies that own wind 
energy projects: Internet research using data 
from 4C Offshore and project websites; 
 Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
financing of those key companies on the basis of 
their annual reports (qualitative sample); 
 Analysis of the structural political support for the 
Energiewende. 
3 
I will begin my research with a literature review to identify potential evidence for the structural 
dependency of the energy transition upon the FS in the academic debate. 
After the literature survey I will assess the fragility of Energiewende in terms of financial instability. I will 
identify the key companies that own offshore wind parks in Germany, including their geographic origin and 
their legal structure, as ownership is linked to the power of decision making and absorbing profits (Minsky, 
1989). I will use data from 4C Offshore (2016) and from additional internet research to identify the 
companies that own wind parks. Depending on the identified key companies of the offshore segment of the 
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Energiewende, I will draw a qualitative sample of companies which I will analyse in depth in the further 
course of my thesis. I will pick the qualitative sample based the quantitative importance of the companies 
and differences in their company structure in order to gain insights into impacts of different company 
structures. 
I will use the latest public accessible annual reports of the key companies in my sample to quantitatively 
and qualitatively analyse their liability structure. In this analysis I will draw upon methods and tools from 
financial statement analysis. Considering Minsky’s theory of Money Manager Capitalism the main focus 
will be on the debt-to-equity-ratio indicating the leverage of a company, liquidity of companies and 
financial liabilities stemming from the FS (Minsky, 1986). Finally I will investigate whether current political 
instruments reduce instability risks. 
 
2.5.2 Design of Critical Discourse Analysis 
The Energiewende is an attempt to achieve a sustainable energy system while holding on to the neoliberal 
structure of Germany’s economy and building the transition upon the conventional FS. Neoliberal 
systems have a “discourse-driven character” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 13) and similar structures can result in 
different concrete social processes and actions, depending on the discourse that gives meaning to these 
structures (Fairclough, 1992). FS are highly complex and interconnected social orders and include social 
processes (Prates & Farhi, 2015).Analysing possible strategies to reach a sustainable energy system within 
the neoliberal system can’t be limited to a structural analysis, but must also consider the role of discourse.  
The set of social relations and structures - as described by Minsky - are filled with meaning by agents and 
their discourses (Fairclough, 2010). On the one hand, discourses can support the interest of a social group 
(e.g. the financial industry) by creating and reproducing power relations (Fairclough, 1992). On the other 
hand, discourses can modify and transform power structures and play an important role in social change. 
Discourses influence which problem solving strategies get selected and become hegemonic (Fairclough, 
1992, 2010). 
This perspective implies a meaningful agency: The agents of the Energiewende can offset negative impacts 
arising from structural financial linkages, if their discourse shows awareness of potential instability threats 
and of the importance of risk mitigation. Looking at both structures and discourses can be a powerful and 
comprehensive approach to analyse social problems. Structures and discourses impact each other 
dialectically. Discourse is constituted, but also constitutive. 
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I will complement the analysis of the structural dimension with an analysis of the discursive awareness of 
the key agents of the Energiewende (RQ2) and of their discursive emphasis on risk mitigation (RQ3) to 
assess if their discourse can potentially offset structural weaknesses. 
Considering my research aim, theoretical model and ontology, CDA, as developed by Fairclough, is the most 
suitable approach within discourse theories to analyse the problem awareness of key agents. This has three 
main reasons: 
 CDA is a framework within critical realism that can embrace my structural analysis as well as my 
discursive analysis in a consistent way: CDA acknowledges that discourse shapes reality in a 
dialectic relation with material structures. This differentiates CDA from post-structural approaches 
of discourse analysis (e.g. Foucault) that see only discourses as constitutive for reality; 
 CDA acknowledges a meaningful agency, which emphasizes the role of agents in shaping 
structures. Consequently it matters whether the key agents are aware of the potential risks arising 
from financial dependence; and 
 CDA aims to develop “actions for a better world” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 14) and acknowledges the 
possibility of evaluating discourses and the appropriateness of social strategies by reasoning. This is 
closer to the normative nature of critical realism and Sustainability Science than the post-structural 
idea of coexisting discourses without the possibility of judging between them. 
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On the basis of these considerations I will use the following methods to answer RQ2 and RQ 3 (table 2): 
Table 2. Methods RQ 2 and RQ 3 (own table) 
Research question Methods Section 
Discursive dimension, analysis of problem awareness 
2 If companies are 
dependent on the FS, to 
which degree are the 
agents of the 
Energiewende aware of 
the risk emerging from 
financial instability? 
Linguistic and semiotic analysis of the sections 
addressing financial instability risks in 
a) Annual reports of key companies; and 
b) German sustainability strategy and monitoring 
report regarding the Energiewende. 
4 
3 If agents are aware, do 
they emphasize the 
importance of risk 
mitigation and if so, 
how? 
Linguistic and semiotic analysis of sections adressing 
risk mitigation measures in 
a) Annual reports of the key companies; and 
b) German sustainability strategy and monitoring 
report regarding the Energiewende. 
4 
In order to analyse the governmental discourse I will use the German overall sustainability strategy, as well 
as the latest monitoring reporting for the Energiewende. Both are public available key documents 
representing the governmental strategy and policy instruments for the Energiewende. For analysing the 
discourse of the key companies, I will use annual reports. Annual reports are suitable for my research, as 
the FS is amongst the main addressees of this reporting (Valeo, 2013; Zanola, 2010). Annual reporting is a 
key instrument for companies to communicate their self-image, far beyond accounting statements and 
regulatory and technical information. It is “the corporate voice” (Zanola, 2010, p. 16), and is therefore 
suitable for identifying the discourse underlying companies' decision making. 
One drawback of the use of annual reports is that elements of internal discursive communication6 are not 
represented in this external communication tool. This is one of the limitations of my research (see chapter 
5.5). The fact that annual reports are audited by an independent third party makes them nevertheless a 
valuable data source. 
                                                             
6 E.g. minutes of board meetings or internal comments that are not public accessible.  
14 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates how CDA can embrace structural as well as discursive analyses in a consistent 
manner: 
 
Figure 4. Dimensions of CDA (own figure, developed on the basis of Fairclough, 1992) 
The analysis of relations between discursive and non-discursive elements must consider three dimensions: 
(i) the wider social practice, including its (non-discursive) material elements and structures, power 
relations, hegemony and ideology, (ii) the concrete communicative events and texts embedded in the wider 
social practice that reflect and shape this social practice in a dialectic way, and (iii) the discursive practices, 
such as text production, distribution, and consumption, which mediate between the two other dimensions 
(Fairclough, 1992).  
According to Fairclough, the analysis of concrete communicative events is important, as it gives insights 
into the concrete outcomes of the interplay between discourses and structures (Fairclough, 1992). With 
reference to Marx, Fairclough and Graham (2002, p. 19) argue that language “is the only way we have of 
grasping the diachronics of changing social circumstances” and furthermore is “both product, producer, and 
reproducer of social consciousness, which in turn is in a reciprocally causal relationship with the whole of the 
human experience.” In this regard, Fairclough follows Foucault’s concept of language as a social practice 
from which power emerges (Foucault, 1979).  
I will mainly focus on the social practice and the text level, as the consumption and production of the 
analysed texts follows (legally) standardized procedures. All agents follow the same rules of text 
production, which erases peculiar insights into social change from this dimension.  
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3 Structural dependency of the renewable energy transition upon the financial 
system 
So far the German RE transition has been successful and is often used as a positive example for a major 
economy transitioning to RE. But if Minsky’s instability hypothesis is right, then this success could be the 
boom that sows the seeds for the next bust (Minsky, 1989; Minsky & Whalen, 1996). Currently interest 
rates are extremely low and market liquidity is high: investors are seeking for investment opportunities and 
project scales increase. Voices in academia advocate for lowering regulatory risk weights7 for RE 
investments. “The stability of banks – which is a unanimous requirement for our finance system - will not be 
threatened by the RE specific RW” (Breitschopf & Pudlik, 2013, p. 187). This optimism and boom could end 
if rising interests lead to the bankruptcy of key companies with high leverage ratios and high interest 
sensitivity, or if the profits of projects stay below expectations leading to credit impairments at banks. 
Additionally, general financial crises that don't originate from the offshore wind energy sector could 
threaten the stability of the RE transition, for example if credit markets dry out. The structural dependency 
of the RE transition upon the FS will be the question of concern in the upcoming chapter. 
 
3.1 Literature review on structural dependency 
Academic literature acknowledges a general need for finance for the Energiewende, but assumes that 
this finance can be reached by designing RE projects according to the needs of investors. Financial 
instabilities are not considered. I come to this finding on the basis of my literature review using LUBSearch. 
I have used all possible combinations of the following terms to identify relevant literature (table 3):  
Table 3. Terms used in literature review (own table) 
Terms of Energiewende Terms of FS 
Energiewende, renewable energy Germany, 
energy transition, offshore wind energy 
Investment, investors, financial system, financial 
markets, finance, banking 
                                                             
7  Risk weight (”RW”) is a regulatory figure, which indicates how much equity a financial institution has to allocate to 
its issued loans. The higher the risk weight, the more equity must be assigned. This limits the leverage of financial 
institutions. 
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The literature review resulted in 1,641 papers. I scanned the titles of the papers and if the title indicated 
relevance for this thesis, I went through the abstract and body of the paper. I identified 18 papers that 
address the relation between financial stability and the investment into offshore wind energy or RE.  
Already in 2012, Carnicer & Peñuelas (2012) noted that the relationship between reforms of the FS and the 
needed changes in the energy system must be further researched. In 2016, however, Hall, Foxon and 
Bolton (2016) continue to demand a further analysis of the role of financial institutions in the energy 
transition. 
Research has identified a general correlation between the development of the FS and RE. The expansion 
of RE is significantly related to the general investment climate, economic growth (del Rio & Tarancon, 2012; 
Eyraud, Clements, & Wane, 2013), and the development of financial intermediation positively impacts the 
total electricity output from RE projects (Fangmin & Jun, 2011; Kim & Park, 2016). During the financial 
crisis, investors were irrationally exuberant (Bohl, Kaufmann, & Siklos, 2015), and total energy investment 
declined in 2009 by 7 %, as a backlash of the financial crisis (Kalamova, Kaminker, & Johnstone, 2011). As 
corporate debt is the main source for wind turbine investments (Corsatea, Giaccaria, & Arántegui, 2014), 
the lack of finance might have hampered investment. 
Cochran, Hubert, Marchal and Youngman (2014) identified the need to provide finance independent from 
market cycles to support the expansion of RE. They identify public financial institutions (“PFI”) as a possible 
source for this finance. PFIs however refinance themselves usually on the basis of international capital 
markets and aim to attract private financial resources in addition to the provided public resources. Their 
independence from market cycles is limited, which is ignored by Cochran et al. Cochran et al instead use 
strong modality when describing the access of PFIs to financial resources, without mentioning the need of 
functioning capital markets: “…the PFIs studied here [including the German KfW] all have access to high 
volumes of stable, long-term finance. […] In many instances, this ability to leverage low cost funding allows 
these institutions to provide concessional financing for projects without the use of public subsidies” 
(Cochran et al., 2014, p. 11). 
Ayres et al. (2013) discuss that the instability of the FS needs to be addressed by political tools in order to 
realize a transition to RE. “Almost nothing has been done to prevent a recurrence as fundamental causes of 
the crisis” (Ayres et al., 2013, p. 10). But in the same manner like Cochran et al., Ayres et al. (2013) demand 
a “financial incubator” and “financial innovations” (p.11) to attract private investments without the need of 
public subsidies. Although this is discussed in the light of the latest financial crisis that involved substantial 
liquidity shortages, the assumption that private financial resources are available is not questioned. The call 
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for financial innovation is in line with the finding from Pathania and Bose (2014) who found that 
innovations in finance were crucial in energy transitions. 
Johnson (2015, p. 178) notes that “A discussion on the current financial sector is beyond the scope of this 
note yet it is clear that we have a financial sector out of control, divorced from the real economy and 
incapable of providing the liquidity at the scale needed to address key sectors of the real economy” (2017, p. 
178). Like Ayres et al. (2013) he states that financial innovation can overcome the weaknesses of the FS 
and contribute to a “mobilization of private capital”. Whether this private capital is available is again not 
discussed. Criteria for financial innovations are not articulated. 
Kemfert and Schäfer (2012) problematized that governmental resources are allocated to stabilize the FS 
during crises, while limited resources are available for the support of RE. During the recent financial crisis, 
governments reduced their support for RE (Creutzig et al., 2014). Additionally, private investors lack access 
to credit, as shown by the decline of the syndication market in the recent financial crisis (Jacobsson & 
Karltorp, 2013; Kemfert & Schäfer, 2012). Suggested counter measures are the increase of risk capital 
(Jacobsson & Karltorp, 2013; Kemfert & Schäfer, 2012), introducing a link between governmental support 
for the FS and the demand to finance the RE transition (Kemfert & Schäfer, 2012) and strengthening of PFIs 
(Jacobsson & Karltorp, 2013), as well as governmental subsidies (Gutermuth, 1998). The general research 
and the suggested solutions lack theoretical approaches and identification of causal relationships that 
explain the relationship between RE and FS in more depth.  
Even less attention is paid to the stability of RE companies themselves. Brabänder, Kammlott and 
Schiereck (2015) found that substantial investment of public energy companies into RE reduces their 
success. Conrad and Kostka (2017) point out that investments by state-owned Chinese companies, which 
often have high leverage ratios, bare the risk of an acquisition of these investors by other investors. Both 
papers, however, don’t relate the potential instability of companies to the instability of the FS. 
The main themes dominating the remaining, not directly relevant literature are: 
 Investment barriers and risks related to RE (e.g. Arnold & Yildiz, 2015; Balks & Grasse, 2016; Lüthi, 
2010; Salm, Hille, & Wüstenhagen, 2016), often under the assumption of a functioning FS. None of 
the risks identified from the investor point of view are related to nonmonetary damages or a time 
lag in the transition to RE due to a lack of investment capital. Instead all of the identified risks 
would lead to a diminishment of profits (compare results of Angelopoulos et al., 2016; Balks & 
Breloh, 2014; Gatzert & Kosub, 2016); and 
18 
 
 Political instruments that can attract private investment by reducing risks and investment barriers 
(e.g. Alishahi, Moghaddam, & Sheikh-El-Eslami, 2012; Häseler, 2014; Kwiatkowska-Drozdz & Mazur, 
2012; Schuchardt, Hoffjan, & Finger, 2015; Speth, 2013). 
Ignorance of the financial instability risk for the RE transition is traceable in several statements in the 
literature (see following examples): 
  “Financing is potentially a challenge, but the experience so far has been that funds are always 
forthcoming for good projects within stable regulatory environments” (Genoese et al., 2015, p. 
196); 
 “The investment in the renewable energy technology offshore will grow” (Bendfeld, Balluff, & 
Krauter, 2015, p. 375); 
 “However, since the underlying technologies have been tried and tested over a few years, debt 
investors are willing to invest large sums, and public markets and private equity will support the 
growth of such companies” (Kalamova et al., 2011, p. 25). 
To sum up: 
 Literature provides evidence for a general need for finance for the Energiewende; 
 Most commonly research is done under the assumption of a functioning and stable FS. Minsky’s 
instability hypothesis is not considered; 
 Extensive discussion therefore focuses on how to attract private capital; 
 How companies depend concretely on private capital is not researched at all; and 
 If the general relationship between financial stability and RE is discussed, theory informed 
discussions are missing and solutions are not based on sound theory. 
My literature review points to a substantial knowledge gap in academia. Research is fragmented and does 
not consider the interconnectedness between financial instability and stability of the RE transmission. To 
ensure the stability of the RE transmission, the linkages between the financial and the energy system need 
to be uncovered, dependency of key companies needs to be analysed and possible risk mitigation measures 
must be discussed. To address the identified knowledge gap, I will proceed in analysing the structural 
dependency. 
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3.2 Who rules in the German offshore wind energy market? 
In this section I will identify the main actors of the German offshore wind energy market. Based on the 
processes of financialization and Minsky’s theory that emphasizes the power of the FS over the economy, I 
expect that big companies, which can implement more efficient large scale projects, are dominant in the 
market. The reasoning is as follows: 
When making investment decisions, financial institutions follow the discourse of financialization, 
expressed by the maxim of profitability and maximization of risk return rates (Minsky, 1986). Central 
agents of the FS manage large portfolios, which makes bigger companies and projects more suitable 
investment targets. Efficiency of investment management and familiarity with assets increases with 
company and project size (Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, & Wang, 2012). An upscale in business activities is also 
profitable for companies, as economies of scale can be generated. Consequently, both agents have an 
interest in (debt financed) growth, continuously increasing company sizes, and project scales, leading to 
concentration effects. This concentration of market activities increases the systemic risk in the RE sector. 
The growth trend I expect on the basis of Minsky’s theory is observable in Germany: Project sizes and 
need for investment increased in the past ten years and concentration effects dominate the German RE 
market (Dedecca et al., 2016; EWEA, 2016), creating market barriers for new companies, which lack access 
to funding sources (Dedecca et al., 2016). 
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To investigate the market concentration and identify the key companies of the German offshore wind 
energy market, I collected and mapped data regarding projects and respective investors of these projects 
(figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Location of the investors of German offshore wind energy projects (own map, created with data from 4C 
Offshore (2016) and internet research). Red dots = Location of investor, grey dots = planned wind energy 
parks, blue dots = installed wind energy parks, turquoise dots = wind energy parks under construction8 
The German market of offshore wind energy is centralized, as expected. The main investor is DONG, 
followed by EnBW. The ten main investors (assessed by the owned megawatts; “MW”) of the German 
offshore wind energy market hold 73 % of the installed and planned MWs. 12 % of the projects have local 
investors (WPD AG, EWE AG and PNE Wind AG), of which only EWE AG (holding 2 % of the projects) is 
public. The majority of profits will be absorbed by non-local investors. The bulk of investors is domestic 
(56 %) and only 11 % are non-European. Private companies hold approximately 56 % of projects, while 
companies that have public and private owners hold 13 % of projects (see appendix I).  
                                                             
8  I originally prepared figure 5 for the final paper of the course “Water and Sustainability”. 
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The structure of the investors points towards the substantial role of private ownership and therefore 
private financial capital in offshore wind energy. My results support the concentration effects and 
superiority of big companies as suggested by Minsky’s theory, and described in literature. 
 
3.3 Dependency of key companies 
I will analyse the structural dependency of the key companies implementing offshore wind energy on the 
FS. As a qualitative sample I will use the two companies that hold the most offshore wind energy capacity: 
DONG and EnBW. Analysing two companies with different ownership structures can give additional insights 
into the influence of ownership on financial dependency, while staying within the scope of this thesis.  
Minsky’s theory suggests that financial dependency can be indicated by a high debt-to-equity-ratio, less 
liquidity of companies and significant financial liabilities stemming from the FS (Minsky, 1986). I will 
structure my analysis according to these criteria. 
 
3.3.1 Company structure of DONG and EnBW 
DONG is a Danish energy company, which is listed at the stock exchange. The main shareholders are the 
Danish government (50.1 %) and SEAS-NVE (10 %) as public investors, followed by Goldman Sachs (7 %), 
and the Capital Group (6 %) as private investors, both of which are actors of the FS9. The FS has influence 
on the board, as large shareholders can suggest the election of board members to the annual meeting 
(DONG, 2017). EnBW, in contrast, is a 93 % publicly owned German energy company and not influenced by 
shareholders of the FS. Although being listed on the stock exchange, the main shareholders of EnBW are 
the NECKARPRI-Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH, owned by the German federal state Baden-Wuerttemberg 
(46.8 %) and OWE Energie-Beteiligungs GmbH, owned by nine counties of Baden-Wuerttemberg (46.8 %).9 
Major differences between the two companies lay the ownership structure, EnBW’s multi-sectoral business 
model, and EnBW’s higher debt-to-equity ratio (table 4). In terms of liquidity EnBW has mainly cash, which 
is less sensitive to financial instabilities than DONG’s financial assets. In contrast to DONG, EnBW aims to 
limit growth to internal funding capacities. Main similarities lay in the funding sources and the substantial 
amount of financial liabilities and the general substantial dependency upon the FS. 
                                                             
9  The rest is owned by minor investors, as parts of the shares are in the free float. 
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Table 4. DONG’s and EnBW’s financial structure (own table; source: DONG, 2017; EnBW, 2017) 
 DONG EnBW 
Owners Danish government (50.1 %), 
financial investors and minority 
investors 
German federal state Baden-
Wuerttemberg and its counties 
and minority investors 
Business model Operative in the segments Wind 
Power, Bioenergy & Thermal 
Power and Distribution & 
Customer Solutions. Aims to grow 
business in wind energy 
significantly. 
Operative in the segments Sales, 
Grids, Renewable Energies and 
Energy Generation (nuclear 
energy, coal and gas). The 
segment of RE generates 
currently 15 % of the profits, but 
its share shall increase to 30 % 
until 2020 
Managed assets10 (as per 
end of 2016) 
EUR 18.2 billion EUR 38.5 billion 
Financial liabilities EUR 9 billion EUR 12 billion 
Debt-to-equity-ratio (as 
per end of 2016)11 
1.2 (2015: 1.8) 11 (2015: 6.4) 
Main funding sources Operations, debt (hybrid capital 
and bonds) and divestments 
Operations, debt (hybrid capital 
and bonds) and divestments 
Liquidity buffer Financial assets Cash 
Financial strategy Future investment is not limited to 
internal funds. Attractiveness for 
investors shall be ensured via 
continuous increase of dividend.  
Limitation of investment to 
retained cash flow. 
Dependency upon the FS Hedging, Refinancing of due debts, 
viability of partnership model for 
divestments, financing of future 
growth, source of equity capital. 
Hedging, Refinancing of due 
debts, viability of partnership 
model for divestments. 
This short comparison points to dependency and instability risks for both companies. I will now discuss the 
indicators debt-to-equity-ratio, liquidity, and financial liabilities in more depth. 
 
                                                             
10  According to the definition for small and medium-sized enterprizes of the European Comission DONG and EnBW 
are large companies, as their total assets exceeds EUR 43 million. As a comparison The assets of DONG equal the 
investment value of the eleven offshore wind energy projects that reached final investment decision in Europe in 
2016 (Wind Europe, 2017) . 
11  Typically large stable, public traded manufacturing companies have debt-to-equity-ratios between 2 and 5. Debt to 
equity ratios larger than 5 to 6 indicate an increased bankruptcy risk (Gallo, 2015). 
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3.3.2 Debt-to-equity-ratio 
The debt-to-equity-ratio is one indicator for the bankruptcy risk of a company and therefore the possibility 
that the FS carries losses and is destabilized, if the company can’t serve its loans. Considering the significant 
difference in the debt-to-equity-ratio (DONG = 1.2 vs EnBW = 11), DONG seems to be more stable. One 
reason of the significant difference in the debt-to-equity-ratio, however, is the different accounting of 
hybrid-capital12, which both companies have. DONG accounts its hybrid-capital (EUR 1.8 billion) as equity, 
while EnBW accounts it (EUR 3.0 billion) as liabilities. If EnBW accounted this capital as equity, its debt-to-
equity ratio would be 5.6, indicating a much lower risk. Another reason for the high difference are EnBW’s 
significant losses from its activity in nuclear energy. Although EnBW’s debt-to-equity-ratio is higher than 
DONG’s, rating agency’s estimate EnBW’s bankruptcy risk as slightly lower than DONG’s. This is partly due 
as EnBW is backed by a German federal state. The rating agency Moody’s considered the stance of Baden-
Wuerttemberg as a valuable asset (Moody's, 2016a)13. 
In terms of dependency upon a functional FS, both companies have to refund their substantial hybrid-
capital-bonds, which is usually done via the FS. Both companies are dependent on a functional FS to keep 
their debt-to-equity-ratio stable. 
 
3.3.3 Liquidity of companies 
In times of financial crises, companies can draw needed liquidity from own liquidity. The components of the 
liquidity buffer determine whether the mitigation of liquidity risks is effective. During the recent financial 
crisis, the value of financial assets diminished significantly, as investors liquidized their assets to raise 
liquidity. Cash resources are therefore more effective in mitigating refinancing and liquidity risk (Harford, 
Klasa, & Maxwell, 2014). 
                                                             
12  Hybrid capital is a mix of debt and equity, that, other than pure equity, needs to be redeemed unless the 
company’s economic situation falls below a defined level. 
13  Although rating agencies have been party responsible for the latest financial crises due to their wrong rating, the 
company assessment’s of ating agencies can still give a first indication for a company’s creditworthiness. 
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Both companies have substantial liquidity buffers, which they can potentially use to ensure their liquidity in 
times of financial crises. The structure of their liquidity buffer, however, is significantly different (table 5): 
Table 5. Liquidity buffer of DONG and EnBW (in EUR; own table, source: EnBW 2017, DONG 2017) 
 DONG EnBW 
Cash EUR 0.4 billion EUR 4.0 billion 
Other financial assets EUR 2.1 billion14 EUR 0.3 billion 
Sum EUR 2.5 billion EUR 4.3 billion 
% of total assets 14 % 11 % 
DONG’s risk mitigation strategy, which builds mainly on financial assets, might not be effective in times 
of a financial crisis. Moody’s states regarding the financial resources that “current financial flexibility, and 
levers available to the company, may prove insufficient to maintain credit quality” (Moody's, 2016b, p. 1). 
EnBW’s sensitivity to distortions in the FS is lower. 
 
3.3.4 Financial liabilities 
If the sourcing of funding relies primarily on the FS, then companies are exposed to the risk that the 
refinancing of due liabilities or of growth strategies will become impossible during financial crises. Sources 
of cash inflow and the structure of financial liabilities indicate how a company sources its funding. I will now 
discuss both indicators.  
The main cash flow sources of DONG and EnBW are operations, divestments and debt. The following 
concerns are linked to those cash flow sources: 
 Both companies can’t fully rely on their internally generated cash flow from operation to finance 
future investment. DONG plans to divest from its cash flow generating oil and coal engagements, 
which raised concerns of rating agencies regarding the stability of the future cash flows (Moody's, 
2016b). EnBW’s lack of profitability leads to decreased internal cash flows. Nevertheless, EnBW 
aims to finance future net investments15 entirely by internal funding by 2020. In 2016 70 % of the 
                                                             
14  DONG’s financial resources consist mainly of bond portfolios from governments and mortgages. 
15  Net investment = cash relevant investment minus cash relevant divestment. 
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net investment could be financed by internal funding. As internal funds are volatile, this aim does 
not lead to a stable RE transition, as will become clear in chapter 4.3.  
 Cash flows from divestments can only be generated if assets for divestment are available. Both 
companies aim to divest from parts of their engagement after they finished the construction of 
wind parks (“Partnership Model”). This model requires liquid investors to acquire the sold assets, 
and therefore requires a functional FS. In 2016 the Danish pension fund PKA, as well as the holding 
and investment company KIRKBI A/S, purchased shares in DONG’s wind parks. DONG invests the 
divested capital into new construction projects, which requires additional fresh capital. 
Consequently, the overall need for investment capital is not reduced via the Partnership Model.  
 If financing from debt exceeds internal financing from operations, the debt-to-equity-ratio and 
consequently the bankruptcy risk rises, also increasing the risk of financial crises (Minsky, 1989). 
Refinancing via debt requires a functional FS. Diversification of funding sources within the FS can’t 
reduce the systemic risk of an overall collapse of the FS, as the performance of financial 
institutions is positively correlated. The recent financial crisis led to an overall decrease of liquidity 
in the FS and an overall credit crunch (Gai, 2013). The structure of financial liabilities of both 
companies points to a historically substantial dependency of both companies upon the FS, with 
substantial liabilities traced from international capital markets (hybrid capital and bonds and 
liabilities from derivatives16; table 6). 
                                                             
16  Derivatives of EnBW and DONG are mainly hedging instruments to decrease interest and currency risk as well as 
commodity price risk. Derivatives have usually financial counterparties. 
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Table 6. Financial liabilities of DONG and EnBW (in EUR; own table, source: EnBW 2017, DONG 2017) 
  
DONG EnBW 
2016 2015 Change 2016 2015 Change 
Hybrid capital 1.766,4 1.766,4 0 % 2.989,8 1.987,9 50% 
Bonds 2.682,5 3.895,3 -31 % 3.018,3 3.504,3 -14% 
Derivatives 924,0 1.270,8 -27 % 1.559,4 2.056,8 -24% 
Bank liabilities 541,9 958,1 -43 % 1.455,5 1.588,5 -8% 
Trade payables 1.336,5 1.423,1 -6 % 3.193,4 3.523,8 -9% 
Other payables 1.719,9 1.842,8 -7 % 139,6 135,9 3% 
Sum 8.971,2 11.156,5 -20 % 12.356,0 12.797,2 -3% 
DONG’s bank liabilities mainly stem from the public owned European Investment Bank and the 
Nordic Investment Bank. Part of EnBW’s bank liabilities are against the public European Investment 
Bank. Public owned institutions might be more stable in an eventual financial crisis due to their 
backup by governments. Despite this, even those institutions finance themselves with bonds issued 
on capital markets and are not entirely immune against financial instabilities. 
 
3.4 Summing up structural instability indicators  
Academic literature and my analysis of the German offshore wind energy market support the claim that 
private ownership as well as private investment capital play a substantial role in the German offshore wind 
energy market. Despite this it is hardly discussed in literature, how instability risks emerging from the FS 
can threaten the stability of RE companies.  
My analysis has shown that the key companies of the German offshore wind energy market would be 
highly affected by distortions in the FS (table 7), as DONG and EnBW are substantially dependent on the 
FS. The similarity of exposure to the risk of financial instability is high and the structure of both companies 
provides strong evidence for the dependency of the key companies upon the FS.  
Although EnBW has a much higher debt-to-equity-ratio, its financial policy is more conservative than 
DONG’s as EnBW does not aim to finance future growth with debt and has a liquidity buffer that is less 
sensitive to financial instabilities. This might indicate a decreased risk aversion in private companies 
influenced by shareholders of the FS. 
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Table 7. Instability risks due to distortions in the FS (own table) 
Indicator (drawn 
from Minsky) 
DONG EnBW 
Debt-to-equity 
ratio 
Medium risk 
 Low debt-to-equity-ratio 
 Refinancing for hybrid-capital 
needed in the long term 
 Shareholders are financial 
institutions 
Medium risk 
 High debt-to-equity-ratio, 
partly due to accounting of 
hybrid capital 
 Refinancing for hybrid-capital 
needed in the long term 
 BUT: Public shareholders that 
are independent from the FS 
Liquidity buffer High risk (financial assets) Low risk (cash) 
Financial 
liabilities 
High risk 
 Volatile internal cash flow 
 Divestment depends on 
functional FS 
 Majority of financial liabilities 
stems from FS 
High risk 
 Volatile internal cash flow 
 Divestment depends on 
functional FS 
 Majority of financial liabilities 
stems from FS 
 
3.5 No political risk mitigation 
The German government promotes offshore wind energy via the following instruments, which are 
insufficient to mitigate the identified structural risk: 
 The RE act (“EEG”), which defines the RE expansion corridor and ensures subsidies for generated 
RE, but not an initial financing of the projects; and 
 Funding from the state owned bank KfW. The funding makes up for only a minor part of the needed 
capital and the majority of the investment capital needed to finance offshore wind energy projects 
has to be provided by private sources17. Additionally, as the KfW bases its own financing on the FS, 
financial instability, as described by Minsky, is potentially relevant for this bank as well, unless the 
state provides liquidity in crises due to its ownership. 
                                                             
17  For projects that were partly financed by KfW, KfW’s average share has been 20 % (see appendix II). 
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Current political instruments are insufficient to mitigate the risk of financial instability of the RE 
transition. I will now analyse, whether the discourse of the key agents of the offshore wind energy 
sector shows awareness and emphasizes the importance of risk mitigation. 
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4 Discursive analysis of the problem awareness of the key agents 
In addition to the already analysed structures, the discourse is a second force determining social practices 
(Fairclough, 1992). The negative impacts arising from the structure might be alleviated by problem 
awareness of the key agents of the Energiewende (i.e. government and/ or key companies). In the 
upcoming chapter I will present the results of my analysis of the problem awareness of the key agents. The 
detailed linguistic analysis is attached as appendix III to V. 
 
4.1 Problem awareness of the German government 
The German government is responsible for setting up the political framework surrounding the 
Energiewende. In times of financial instability, the German government could be the lender of last resort. I 
will use political documents to identify whether the German government is firstly aware of the instability 
risk of the Energiewende stemming from the FS (RQ2) and secondly, how it addresses the structural risk 
(RQ3). 
The central documents of the Energiewende are the overall German sustainability strategy (German 
Government, 2017a) and the latest monitoring report regarding the Energiewende ("monitoring report"; 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2016).18 In summary, the analysis of the overall 
sustainability strategy and the monitoring report regarding the Energiewende points to: 
 An awareness of general financial needs of the RE transition; combined with 
 An ignorance of instability risk emerging from financial structures; 
 A lack of coordination between RE and FS politics; leading to 
 A lack of risk mitigation measures to address eventual financial instabilities. 
I will now explain how I inferred these conclusions. 
  
                                                             
18 I analyse both documents in the original language German and translate relevant passages. 
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Awareness of general financial needs while ignoring instability risks 
In the monitoring report the government observes the development of investments for RE. This points to a 
general awareness for the substantial capital needed for the transition. This awareness is also present in 
other governmental publications (see e.g. German Government, 2017b). Despite this, it is not discussed 
how the needed capital is provided, and if capital sources are stable. The German government is optimistic 
about the capability of the FS to deliver the desired RE transition. The government relies on investor’s free 
will to provide the needed capital for the RE transition. This points to the underlying assumption that 
investors have sufficient access to investment capital. Financial subsidies or governmental investments for 
the transition to RE are only mentioned in connection with subsidies for research.  
The role of investors and in providing this investment is hardly recognized: Passivization that leaves 
investors unidentified and ignores the importance of financial stability dominates governmental 
communication, as shown by the following example:  
The government observed a decrease in investments in 2015. As the expansion of RE remained stable at 
the same time, the government follows: “This could be an indicator for reduced costs per installed plant. A 
reason could also be structural effects, i.e. increased installations of cheaper technologies” (own translation 
p.130). The weak modality (“could be x or could be y”) indicates that the government did not investigate the 
cause fully. It is not questioned, why the potential cost reduction did not lead to an increase in the 
expansion instead. Investors have no agency in this explanation and the development of companies and the 
FS is not considered. Overall, the governmental reporting lacks a more conceptual and theoretical 
foundation that goes beyond mainly empiricistic observations and uncovers underlying drivers and 
mechanisms of developments. 
 
Lack of political coordination leading to a lack of risk mitigation measures 
In its sustainability strategy, the German government identified the general need for REs, economic 
investments, and a functioning FS as stepping stones towards sustainability. Despite this, identified causal 
linkages between those elements are limited. This points to a lack of political coordination.  
The German government identifies public and private investment as one steppingstone towards 
sustainability. Of particular note is that RE are not under the specifically targeted sectors for investment. 
This indicates that the Government assumes that sufficient RE investment is already ensured and thus does 
not need to be specifically targeted. 
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Additionally, the threat of financial crises for investment stability is dismissed. This is particularly 
astonishing, as the financial crisis is even briefly mentioned in the context of decreasing investments. But 
despite of observing diminished investments during the crisis, the government does neither draw any 
conclusions, nor does it implement risk mitigations for potential future crises. This shows once more the 
missing conceptualization of observations and points to a substantial lack of risk awareness. 
Financial stability is solely mentioned in the context of general economic prosperity. The particular role of 
the FS in the energy transition is not mentioned. Named regulatory attempts to stabilize the FS, such as 
Basel III, are neither coordinated with the needs of RE investments, nor fully effective in the mitigation of 
the systemic risk in the FS (Aymanns et al., 2016; Schwerter, 2011). 
In sum, my analysis shows that the German government lacks awareness of the financial instability 
threats for the RE transition, partly because of an absence of theory and concepts. The lack of awareness 
leads to insufficient risk mitigation measures. The RE policies are based on the assumption of a functional 
FS. 
 
4.2 Intergovernmental awareness 
Similar to the German government, intergovernmental organizations19 are working under the assumption 
of a functional FS. The German government references in its sustainability strategy the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (“IRENA”), an UN organization concerned, amongst others, with analyses of 
financing for RE. 
IRENA (2016) acknowledges the connection between investments and the success of the RE transition, but 
draws the conclusion that financial risk-return-ratios of RE projects need to be optimised to attract 
investment. Similar to the academic literature and the governmental discourse, IRENA does neither discuss 
the access of investors to capital, nor the stability of the FS. This points again to the underlying assumption 
of a functioning FS. Politics are only important to guide available capital towards RE. Conducted analyses of 
investment dynamics are a valuable first step to ensure a stable capital flow to RE transitions. Despite this, 
not much is said about the general stability of the FS or concrete risk mitigation strategies. The 
intergovernmental awareness of financial instability of the RE transition is low and no concrete risk 
mitigation measures are suggested. 
  
                                                             
19  I refer with this term to the UN organization IRENA. 
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4.3 Problem awareness of the key companies 
I will use the annual reports of DONG (DONG, 2017) and EnBW to analyse their problem awareness. In this 
section I will present the results of my linguistic analysis, which I attach as appendix IV and V.  
           
Figure 6.  Key terms used in DONG’s annual report, 
generated with Worditout, (Chapters: 
Overview, Group, Business Units, 
Governance) 
 Figure 7. Key terms used in EnBW’s annual report, 
generated with Worditout, (Chapters: For 
our Stakeholders, Fundamentals of the 
Group, Business Report) 
According to their purpose both annual reports are generally written in a financial and technical language 
(terms and phrases are e.g. “market value of financial hedging instruments, EBITDA from discontinued 
operations, IPO, catch-up volumes, farm down strategy”). I identified key terms (figures 6 and 7) to infer 
dominating themes (table 8). Both companies focus primarily on economic considerations, their 
performance, and future development and growth. The environment, risks associated to business activity 
and working conditions are from subordinated importance. 
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Table 8. Used key terms in the annual reporting of DONG and EnBW (own table) 
Theme Examples for used key terms Quantity of used key 
terms 
DONG EnBW 
Economy, business and  
management 
Board, business, management, customer, sales, 
market, prices, investments, assets, portfolio 
1,283 5,440 
Energy System Plants, power, energy, offshore, oil, nuclear, 
generation, farms, gas, grids 
849 2,237 
Performance and 
Profitability 
DKK, billion, revenue, profit, results, EBITDA, 
performance, first, high, profit  
794 1,388 
Development and 
Growth 
Goal, new, higher, increase, transmission, 
extension, further, target, more, solutions 
554 985 
Environment Wind, green 251 Not a key 
topic 
Risk Risk, risks 120 247 
Working conditions Safety, employees, working 84 102 
Dominating topics, as well as the terms used to discuss these topics, are highly homogenous. This is partly 
due to the nature of standardized annual reporting, but point also to a similar discourse. Both companies 
have a strategy that strives for growth in RE and an increase in profitability. Emphasize on environmental 
impacts of the business of EnBW and DONG is low, although the environment is considered as a key 
resource by both companies. Climate change is mainly used as a justification for business and growth. All of 
this is not surprising, considering the purpose of annual reports. A more detailed text analysis is necessary 
to come to meaningful results. 
Both reports are written in an optimistic and positive tone, which points to the underlying theme of 
increasing companies’ attractiveness for investors, as typical for annual reports (Valeo, 2013). DONG 
identified financial capital as one of the “key resources” that can “be preserved by “growing operating profit 
and increasing investor returns” to “create a robust financial platform for future growth” (DONG, 2017, p. 
8). Like DONG, EnBW identifies financial capital as one of the key resources, broken down into equity, 
borrowed capital, and positive cash flow. Despite this, in 2016 EnBW’s “significant activities” for capital 
preservation were all targeted to external, borrowed capital (p. 14). 
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Both companies address refinancing risk and the risk of financial instability inadequately. The awareness 
about instability threats from the FS is low and emphasis on risk mitigation is insufficient. I infer that from 
the following data: 
DONG 
DONG does not mention refinancing risk among the main risks, but less prominent in the notes. The risk 
mitigation strategy does not address the systemic risk of a collapse of the whole FS. DONG diversifies 
funding sources and preserves financial assets as a liquidity buffer. Both strategies are inefficient in 
systemic crises that also lead to a significant decrease in asset prices as discussed in the structural analysis.  
The risk of a collapse of the financial markets is described as a risk that “entail[s] a very small probability of 
having a considerable impact on the Group's finances and/ or reputation.” (DONG, 2017, p. 47). As the 
assessed risk is low (“very small probability”, comparable to a “thousand year storm”p.47), DONG might 
underestimate the possibility of a financial crisis that has an effect on its business. Due to the low level of 
risk awareness no risk mitigation measures are mentioned. The subjectivation of the risk, which “entail[s]” 
a certain probability leaves the conducted risk assessment unmentioned and presents the estimated 
likelihood rather as a fact that can be taken for granted. 
The limited problem awareness is underlined by an extreme optimistic estimation regarding financial 
resources available in the future: 
“Within the next couple of years we will likely have excess investment capacity […]. We will 
utilise the investment capacity to pursue value creating investment opportunities. Reducing our 
farm down activities may be an alternative or supplement to new investment opportunities […]. 
However, if value creating investment opportunities do not absorb the excess investment 
capacity we will remain disciplined and return cash to shareholders” (p.15). 
Underlying assumptions are unarticulated, such as the conditions for excessive investment capacity or the 
functionality of the FS. The term “absorb” brings the association of a whole flood of available investment 
capital. One reason that DONG’s management is optimistic about the availability of investment capital 
might be positive past experiences with the partnership model, although the use of past experience for 
future evidence is highly contradictory (Taleb & Martin, 2012). It is not investigated which conditions need 
to be fulfilled to ensure the viability of the model. Additionally the criteria to pick suitable investors with 
sufficient capital strength and the capacity to maintain the RE projects are left out. 
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EnBW 
Similar to DONG EnBW does not mention refinancing risk among the main risks. The risk of a collapse of 
the FS is not articulated at all. Despite this, EnBW identifies two additional risks linked to financial 
instability: 
 Risks in the partnership model, however not regarding liquidity lacks, but regarding price risks and 
time delays; and 
 Risk of distortion of financial asset prices due to volatility in the FS. It is interesting that only EnBW 
considers this risk, although it holds only 15 % of the amount of financial assets held by DONG (see 
3.3.3). One drawback is that EnBW links this risk rather to decreased profitability than to liquidity 
lacks. 
Main difference between both companies lies in the strategy to finance the growth strategy: While DONG 
builds on external funding, EnBW sets the goal to finance future growth entirely with internal funds and 
strives for “a solid financial position” and a “conservative financial policy” (p. 56). To be able to finance 
investments with internal funds, EnBW aims to draw liquidity from divestments. The strategy of divestment 
can only be successful, as long as (i) EnBW has assets to divest and (ii) investors are available to buy the 
assets. Despite this, EnBW indicates to have control over a successful divestment, pointing to insufficient 
risk awareness and low emphasis on risk mitigation. 
Interesting is, why EnBW stresses the importance of financial discipline. I hypothesize that two 
motivations are possible:  
 EnBW is aware that future RE expansion could be threatened by financial instability and therefore 
emphasizes the importance of internal funding. Main goal is to ensure stable investments in RE 
(“Aware Strategy”); or 
  EnBW wants to minimize funding costs and to ensure future access to capital markets by 
stabilizing the debt-to-equity ratio and consequently its creditworthiness and rating. Main goal is to 
ensure profitability (“Creditworthiness Strategy”). 
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If internal funds of EnBW decrease, the underlying reason for the chosen strategy decides about the effect 
on RE investments, as indicated in chapter 3.3.4 and demonstrated in table 9:  
Table 9.  RE investment depending on EnBW’s motivation for financial discipline (own table) 
 Motivation for financial discipline 
Aware Strategy Creditworthiness Strategy 
High internal funds High investments High investments 
Low internal funds Attempt to finance investments 
in RE externally (if FS is not in 
crisis probably successful)  
> Continued investments in RE 
Low investments 
In the case of the Aware Financial Strategy the RE expansion would only be hindered, if internal funding 
decreases and the FS is simultaneously in a crisis. This strategy leads to a risk diversification. On the 
contrary, if EnBW follows the Cost Efficient Financial Strategy, then the expansion of RE is still unstable. I 
will now discuss which of the hypothetical strategies is more likely underlying EnBW’s acting. 
The Aware Strategy-hypothesis is contradicted by: 
 Strong existing other linkages to the FS that the management does not try to reduce;  
 Lack of management’s awareness of this dependency, shown e.g. in the management’s conviction 
that “the company’s future solvency is secured by its solid financial position” (p. 59); 
 And even more explicit, the statement that “EnBW aims to limit cash effective net investment to the 
level of the retained cash flow” (p.75) to maintain an investment-grade rating, which ensures 
lowest capital costs, increases attractiveness for financing partners and provides a “sufficient and 
flexible access to the capital market at all times” (p.55); and  
 The absence of the question whether these capital markets are functional. 
My analysis clearly shows that EnBW follows the Creditworthiness Strategy. It follows that EnBW’s future 
investment is unstable. Internal funds depend on EnBW’s revenue, profitability and divestment success. All 
of these are indirectly still linked to the functionality of the FS. The chosen strategy does not reflect 
awareness regarding instability risks and is insufficient to mitigate risks and stabilize RE investment. 
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Sum up 
Table 10.  Summary of DONG’s and EnBW’s awareness of instability risks emerging from the FS (own table) 
Topic DONG EnBW 
Overall strategy Growth by internationalization and 
increase of profitability and cost 
reduction 
Growth and increase of profitability by 
increased efficiency and focus on 
(international) RE markets 
Main risks associated to 
RE 
Market risks (mainly energy prices, 
exchange risks and interest, addressed 
by hedging); development and 
construction of production assets; 
regulatory risks in wind power; 
operation of offshore wind farms and 
cost of electricity for offshore wind 
power 
Strategic risk in the participation model; 
EU sanctions against Russia; legal risks, 
personnel risks; risks of health, safety, 
security & environment; market prices of 
financial investments; discount rate 
applied for pension funds; impairment 
risks, rating, compliance 
Awareness of general 
funding risk 
Yes Yes 
Financial capital 
identified as a key 
resource? 
Yes Yes 
Financial strategy to 
ensure funding 
 
 Diversification of funding sources  
 Financial resources (mainly 
financial instruments) 
 Partnership model 
 
 Diversification of funding sources 
(emission of hybrid bonds in 2016) 
 Cash reserves 
 Partnership model 
 Limit of new investments to retained 
cash flow 
Awareness of risk in 
financial assets for 
liquidity buffer 
No Yes 
Risk of collapse of the 
FS mentioned? 
Yes, but likelihood assessed as low. 
Consequently no risk mitigation 
measures mentioned. 
No 
Table 10 clearly shows that DONG’s and EnBW’s management are aware of the general need to secure a 
stable funding, especially to ensure their ambitions of international growth and increase of profitability. 
Despite this, the risk of financial instability is understated by both companies. 
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EnBW has a more conservative financial strategy and discourse, expressed in a less optimistic tone when 
talking about future funding and the aim to keep its creditworthiness stable by limiting future investment. 
Strong internal cash flows can be a solution to overcome the dependency upon the FS. My analysis, 
however, has shown that a conservative financial strategy alone is not sufficient to stabilize RE 
investment, as internal cash flows depend on external factors, such as the overall economic situation and 
the stability of FS. Nevertheless has emphasizing on internal funding (“Awareness Strategy”) the potential 
to mitigate instability risks partly. 
 
To sum up: 
 Both companies acknowledge a general need for funding; but 
 don’t see FS instability as a major threat that can decrease future funding sources and 
consequently limit future investment;  
 EnBW, as a public owned company, has generally a more conservative financial strategy (as already 
indicated by the structural analysis). This conservative strategy, however, is not the result of 
instability awareness and does not mitigate instability risks. 
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5 Discussion – Merging structure and discourse 
CDA is a framework that allows the analysis of the structural and the discursive dimension of a social 
problem. After I have analysed both dimensions separately I will bring them together in the upcoming 
discussion. In doing so I will follow the main steps of CDA as described by Fairclough (2001): 
1. Identification of a social problem; 
2. Identification of obstacles to the social problem being tackled; 
3. Who benefits from the problem? Do those who benefit have an interest that the social problem is 
not resolved? 
4. Identification of possible problem solutions; 
5. Critical reflection. 
So far I have mainly engaged with the identification of the problem (i.e. instability of the RE transition due 
to its reliance on the instable FS) and obstacles to the social problem being tackled (i.e. limited awareness 
of the key agents). I will now summarize, contextualize and discuss my findings and deduct from that the 
discussion of the remaining steps of CDA. 
 
5.1 The problem in a nutshell 
On the basis of my analysis I can support my initial claim that the stability of the Energiewende is 
threatened by its dependency upon the FS. With my research I identified a problem, which is so far almost 
ignored in the academic debate. Academia acknowledges a general need for finance of the Energiewende, 
but focuses on the question how to attract the needed capital. The underlying assumption is that the FS is 
functioning. Theoretical informed discussions of financial instability are missing. 
The German offshore wind energy market is centralized, increasing systemic risks. As only seven companies 
own more than three thirds of the energy capacity, the bankruptcy of one company can already have 
significant consequences. Private ownership and therefore private financial capital plays a substantial 
role in offshore wind energy. 
My structural analysis suggested that offshore wind energy companies are dependent on the FS and 
governmental policies don’t mitigate this dependency. DONG and EnBW are examples for owners of 
offshore wind energy projects. Both are structurally dependent on the FS, although the dependency of 
40 
 
DONG as a half privately owned company is higher than of the public owned company EnBW. The similarity 
between both companies regarding the financial structure is high and the structure of both companies 
provides strong evidence for the dependency of the key companies upon the FS. On the basis of Minsky’s 
instability hypothesis I conclude that the structural dependency upon the FS indicates a high instability 
risk for offshore wind energy. 
The awareness regarding the identified structural dependency of the German government and 
intergovernmental organizations is low: The German government acknowledges the need for substantial 
financing for the Energiewende, but aims, comparable to the academic debate, to provide these 
investments by increasing the attractiveness of RE. Policies tackling the Energiewende are not aligned with 
policies tackling the sustainability of the FS and limited awareness results in a low emphasis on risk 
mitigation. 
The structural instability risk of the analysed key companies and their discursive awareness about this risk is 
summed up in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Structural and discursive dimension of instability risks of key companies (own figure) 
EnBW as a public company has generally a more conservative financial strategy and is structurally less 
dependent on the FS, but might interestingly be even less aware of instability risks than DONG. This might 
be caused by the possibility of receiving money from public institutions when the FS fails, but more 
research is needed to back up this claim. The limited problem awareness might be the reason for less 
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emphasize on the importance of risk mitigation is the discourse and consequently less structural risk 
mitigation measures. As risk awareness is low, the need for risk mitigation is hardly emphasized. 
In a nutshell, the problem consist of 
 (i) financial linkages between the FS and the RE transition, which lead to instability of the RE 
expansion (RQ1) due to  
 (ii) instability of the FS (as described by Minsky), and  
 (iii) an ignorance of the emerging instability risk, leading to a lack of risk mitigation (RQ 2 and 3).  
 
5.2 Obstacles 
The limited problem awareness hinders all analysed agents at finding suitable solutions. Despite this, the 
limited awareness might be caused by deeper drivers that differ between the agents. I will now briefly 
discuss those drivers:  
The German government has so far no alternative, reliable solution that could replace the neoliberal 
market based approach for the Energiewende (Peck, 2014). Even in the after mass of the latest financial 
crisis, the German government has built the Energiewende on the ground of the neoliberal FS. This 
supports Peck’s claim (2014) that Neoliberalism is not dead, but a still active zombie. As Neoliberalism is a 
hegemonic process instead of a system that exists in a single form, even the latest sever financial and 
economic crisis did not set an end to the Neoliberal paradigm. Neoliberalism is according to Peck constantly 
reproducing itself, in its attempt to overcome contradictions. Neoliberalism is never entirely free from 
contradictions. Environmental challenges caused by Neoliberalism are solved within the Neoliberal 
paradigm. The Neoliberal Zombie might close the eyes of the government for; 
 The contradiction that sustainability shall be reached by reforms in the energy system while 
ignoring instability risks in the entangled FS; and consequently 
 A possible alternative financial base for the energy transition. 
Companies depend on the FS within Money Manager Capitalism and lack the power to cut this 
dependency. My analysis has shown that a conservative financial strategy alone is not sufficient to reach 
stability. Firstly, companies depend structurally heavily on the FS. Secondly, this structural dependency 
forces companies according to Minsky to align their discourse to the maxims of profit maximization 
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opposed on them by the FS. Consequently the discourse of financialization limits their capacity to see their 
dependency upon the FS more critically from an outside perspective. 
Although not being a central agent for the capital intensive offshore wind energy, the civil society could 
potentially tackle the problem of dependency of the Energiewende upon the FS, by providing investment 
capital. However, as investment needs are extremely high, it is questionable whether civil society could 
deliver sufficient capital. Nevertheless one important role can be to build a movement against the 
superiority of the FS and ask for more a more stable financial design, if civil society can emancipate itself 
from the hegemony of the current hegemonic discourse of financialization. 
 
5.3 Who benefits from the problem? 
Interest in financial linkages and ignorance of the emerging instability risks 
The FS profits from the dependency of all economic sectors upon financial resources, as this offers the 
possibility of extracting surpluses retained within the economy. Main target for investment has so far been 
the fossil fuel industry. Considering the phase out of fossil fuels to mitigate climate change, investors are 
searching for new investment opportunities, such as the subsidised RE sector. The wealth of the financial 
industry is according to Minsky linked to power that enables it to establish and maintain financial linkages 
to the economy, including the RE sector. 
Interest in financial instability 
In how far the financial industry has an interest in financial instability is negotiable. Financial crises can lead 
to severe losses, but parts of these losses could be socialized in the latest crises. If pre-crises profits exceed 
losses during a crisis, the financial industry has an interest in financial instability. 
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5.4 Possible problem solutions 
It would be presumptuous to suggest a concrete solution for the problem on the basis of current findings. 
The complexity of the identified problem clearly demands further research in this area to make sound 
suggestions for problem solutions. The identified interconnectedness advocates ensuring interdisciplinarity 
in future research to make sure that knowledge gaps are filled. Figure 9 shows leverage points to break 
instability mechanisms that could be starting points for future research:  
 
Figure 9. Leverage points to tackle the identified problem (own figure) 
Instability mechanisms could be broken by: 
1. Increasing the stability of FS to ensure that it fulfils its task to finance the economy; 
2. Decrease financial linkages between companies of the RE transitions, for example by developing 
alternative financial sources or by picking less capital intensive RE sources for the RE transition; 
3. Build RE transitions not entirely on market solutions and conventional companies. Alternatives 
could be e.g. RE facilities, which are implemented and maintained by conventional companies, 
but owned and thus refinanced by the state. 
44 
 
The first step for all solutions, however, should be to step outside of the discourse of financialization and 
question the current financial structure of the RE transition to develop creative alternatives. The 
interconnectedness between the energy system and the FS emphasizes the need for a more 
interdisciplinary research that translates also in more consistent and coordinated politics.  
 
5.5 Critical reflection & limitations 
In my research I could support my claim that the stability of the Energiewende is threatened by its 
dependency upon the FS. The following limitations are linked to the way I performed my research: 
 I limited my analysis to the case of offshore wind energy, which is a unique sector due to its capital 
intensiveness. Although my findings are relevant for all big investment project of the 
Energiewende, a generalization for the entire German energy transition is not possible, as this 
transition entails also small scale projects, which are financeable by civil society (e.g. solar panels). 
 I used only financial reporting to identify the discourse of key companies. Those communications 
might not represent the full discourse and further research should be extended to internal 
communication, protocols from board meetings or media communications about those companies; 
 I did an extensive structural and discursive analysis for a qualitative sample of two companies. 
Although the results from my sample were quite homogenous and delivered a sufficient level of 
evidence, an increase of the sample size could provide more insights, for example into the influence 
of ownership structures.  
Limitations are furthermore inherent in: 
 Basing my thesis on Minsky’s instability hypothesis. Although the recent financial crisis 
emphasized the significance of Minsky’s theory, there might be other theories that explain reality in 
a more appropriate way; 
 The methodology of CDA. Conducting discourse analysis always entails a linguistic analysis that is 
never entirely free from subjective concepts of the world and presumptions that determine how 
the analysed texts are read. 
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6 Conclusion 
I aimed to increase the stability of the RE transition to contribute to the transition to a fossil free 
economy. In order to do so, I assessed whether the FS is a stable ground for a transition to RE. This is 
relevant to the broader question, of whether it could be a suitable strategy to reform the energy sector 
without reforming related sectors such as the FS  
Using the framework of CDA I engaged in a discussion between structural financial linkages between the FS 
and offshore wind energy and discursive elements that fill those structures with meaning. My analysis 
pointed to a deep interconnectedness between the energy system and the FS, suggesting that the energy 
transition will be affected by financial crises. 
I wish that I could contribute with my thesis to a higher awareness of the identified problem that leads to 
an extensive discussion about problem solutions. The identified leverage points should be areas of future 
research. Despite this, knowledge and awareness alone does not lead to freedom and emancipation 
(Collier, 1994). Thus, I hope that this critical discussion translates in a dialectical way to a more stable 
financial structure of RE transitions and sets the energy transition free from the power of the FS. 
As a researcher within the field of Sustainability Science I want to end my thesis with a short reflection on 
what I have contributed to my field: By showing the deep interconnectedness of the RE transition and the 
FS I have provided evidence for the need of interdisciplinary research. Solving a problem within 
Sustainability Science always asks for holistic approaches and can never happen via silo thinking20. This 
identified interconnectedness of instability in the financial system and the need to transit to renewable 
energies puts sustainability into a new light: By tackling sustainability problems, all connected systems can 
be changed for a better. Sustainability and other development goals are not necessarily in conflict to each 
other. Thus, the stability of the FS can profit from the transition to RE, if holistic problem solutions are 
picked. Naomi Klein (2014) would conclude: This changes everything! 
  
                                                             
20  The criticism that Minsky’s theory does not capture the full picture (Palley, 2010), the aim to transit to RE puts a 
question mark on the whole Neoliberal growth model. 
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Appendix I: Overview of the German offshore wind energy projects 
Table 11. Overview of owners of offshore wind energy projects (own table, based on data of 4Coffshore, 2017) 
Owner Location Ownership Number of 
turbines 
RE capacity  
in MW 
Dong Energy AS Copenhagen Private & public 314.5 2.005.0 
EnBW AG Karlsruhe Public 259.0 1.818.8 
RWE Essen Private 219.7  1.414.1 
Vattenfall Solna Public 215.7 1.110.5  
EON Düsseldorf Private 150.2 719.8  
WPD Offshore GmbH Bremen Private 93.8 647.4  
PNE Wind AG Cuxhaven Private 88.0 674.0  
Ocean Breeze Energy 
GmbH & CO KG (UniCredit) 
Munich Private 80.0 400.0  
Stadtwerke München Munich Public 94.5 381,8  
Blackstone Group New York Private 64.0 384.0  
China Three Gorges 
Corporation 
Beijing Public 56.0 201.6  
Trianel GmbH Aachen Private 59.2 321.8 
EWE Oldenburg Public 46.5 211.4 
Partners Group Global Private 33.0 198.0 
Laidlaw Capital Group London Private 30.0 252.0 
Siemens AG Munich Private 26.8 160.8  
Kirkbi Billund Private 25.0 99.8 
Northland Power Toronto Private 24.3 149.5 
Global Infrastructure 
Partners LLP 
New York Private 24.3 145.5 
PKA A/S Hellerup Private 24.1 101.2 
Industriens Pensions Copenhagen Private 24.1 101.2 
China Yangtze Power Co. Beijing  Public 24.0 86.4 
Laidlaw Capital Group* London Private 20.1 120.6 
PensionDanmark* Copenhagen Private 20.1 120.6 
Entega AG Darmstadt Private 20.0 99.6 
Axpo International S.A. Luxembourg Private 19.3 96.4 
Siemens Financial Services Munich Private 18.4 66.2 
InfraRed Capital Partners 
Ltd  
London Private & public 16.5 99.0 
Oticon Foundation Smørum Private 14.0 56.2 
Marguerite Fund Luxembourg Public 11.6 41.8 
DEME Concessions NV Zwijndrecht Private 8.3 49.5 
FC Wind 1 & 2 Cologne Private 8.0 40.0 
Esportes Offshore 
Beteiligungs GmbH 
Grabenstätt Private 8.0 40.0 
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Laegernes Pensionskasse Fredriksberg Private 6.1 36.4 
Laerernes Pension Hellerup Private 6.1 36.4 
CDC Infrastructure 
(Investment fund) 
Paris Private 6.0 21.6  
John Laing Group London Private 5.4 33.2 
ADEME  Paris Private 4.1 24.8 
GE Energy UK Bracknell Private 4.1 24.8 
wpd AG Bremen Private 4.1 14.7 
Elektrizitätswerk Zürich Zurich Public 3.9 14.1 
ENOVA Cologne Private & public 3.0 10.8 
Gothaer Leben 
Renewables 
Cologne Private 1.8 11.1 
Sum   2,185.1 12,642.1 
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Appendix II: Investment share of KfW 
The KfW has assigned a total credit amount of EUR 5 billion for financing of up to ten offshore wind energy 
projects (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017). So far four projects with a total investment 
amount of EUR 6.2 billion have been co-financed by KfW (total investment KfW = EUR 1.2 billion). This 
indicates that the average share of KfW’s investment has been 20 %, while 80 % of the project investment 
stemmed from private sources. In future the share of KfW could be higher, as so far only 24 % of the overall 
credit budget has been used, while four out of ten projects have already been financed. Despite this, 
private investment likely is also in future the main capital source, considering the increasing project sizes 
and capital needs. 
Table 12.  Investment share of KfW (own table, based on data from Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 
2017 and 4C Offshore, 2017) 
 Size (MW) Investment KfW 
(million EUR) 
Total Investment 
costs (million EUR) 
Share KfW 
(%) 
Meerwind 288 264 1.200,00    22% 
Global Tech I 400 280 1.800,00    16% 
Butendiek 288 239 1.300,00    18% 
Veja Mate 402 430 1.900,00    23% 
Sum 1.378,00    1.213,00    6.200,00    20% 
 
56 
 
Appendix III: Linguistic analysis German government 
Sustainability strategy (German Government, 2017a) 
Table 13. Linguistic analysis of Germany's sustainability strategy (own table) 
Data Analysis (inference from data) 
The German government aims for an investment 
ratio above the average of the OECD countries, 
stemming from public and private investments. 
However, “the development of the investment 
ratio declined” during the financial crisis (own 
translation, p.134). 
 
By subjectifying the investment ratio, the 
government avoids discussing reasons for the 
decline, such as the fact that the public 
investment did not offset the decline in private 
investment during the crisis. Although the 
financial crisis is mentioned, no causal 
mechanism and relations are expressed. 
 
Target sectors for public investments are “the 
transport infrastructure, broadband expansion, 
energy efficiency measures, climate change 
adaption measures. and optimization of 
conditions for private investments” (own 
translation, p.135). 
Investments into RE are not mentioned, which 
points to missing links between the policies 
addressing the RE transition and policies 
supporting general investment. 
“The conditions for private investors shall be 
optimized” (own translation, p.135). 
It remains unclear, what the optimization of 
conditions for private investments will entail, 
who the private investors are and whether those 
investors have sufficient financial resources to 
utilize the improved investment conditions. The 
important role of the FS for investment is 
dismissed.  
“Only a stable financial sector can ensure a 
sustainable financing of the real economy. 
Drawing from lessons learned from the global 
financial and economic crisis regulations for 
financial markets have been substantially revised 
since 2007 on a Global, European and national 
level […] to increase the resilience of financial 
institutions and financial markets as a whole. […] 
In addition to […] focus is on the sustainable use 
of financial resources. More and more investors 
want to invest their money in sustainable 
projects and companies” (own translation, 
p.123). 
When talking about the need of a FS, the 
government describes the need of “the real 
economy”, not specifying that financing is 
essentially important for the RE transition as a 
key element of the sustainability strategy. 
Through the subjectification of “financial 
markets” the identification of agents is avoided. 
It is not discussed who determines the market 
stability and which role politicians play in this 
regard. Although the government remains 
unclear about the definition of a “stable financial 
sector”, “sustainable financing” and the 
theoretical model underlying policy 
considerations, it suggests that politics achieved 
progress towards “sustainable financing” by 
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“substantially” revising financial regulation, 
without pointing out concrete mechanisms. 
For a transition towards sustainability the 
government seems to count on the development 
of a free will of the investors to support a 
sustainability transition (“want”). Without 
identifying the investors, the government seems 
to assume that investment capital is 
continuously available to them. Under which 
conditions this assumption is fulfilled is not 
discussed.  
“Sustainability is still a long way from being a 
normal part of decision making and actions. […] 
Sustainability profiles from clients, suppliers, 
donors and investors should be the basis for 
financial transactions in the future.” (own 
translation, p.233).” 
Although the government is critical itself about 
the consideration of sustainability in investment 
decisions, it does not draw regulatory 
consequences. Instead, a normative claim is 
made that misses concrete implementation 
measures. This questions the seriousness of the 
governmental intention to implement 
sustainability as an investment criterion. 
The following relevant measures to support the 
transition to renewable energy technologies are 
named (pp.120, 121):  
Implemented: 
 Renewable energy act (“EEG”): the act 
defines the renewable energy expansion 
corridor via defining amounts for 
tendered projects, regulates the 
connection to the grid and ensures a 
promotion of RE via subsidies paid when 
selling RE. 
Planned: 
 EEG-novella 2017: change from cost-
based administrative approach to a 
competitive approach to achieve “cost 
efficiency of the promotion and ensure 
that the defined renewable energy 
expansion corridor will be fulfilled”  
Discussing RE more concretely, the relation to 
the need for investments and a stable FS is 
unarticulated.  
The implemented and planned measures mirror 
the government’s optimism that competition 
and subsidies will ensure that the RE targets are 
met by the market. By using passive voice the 
government avoids naming the agents that will 
implement the RE expansion. The optimism that 
the current political instruments are sufficient to 
ensure a transition towards RE is also expressed 
on the homepage of the German economy 
department in a QA section, in which a strong 
modality is used: “Does the reform of the EEG 
ensure that we achieve our renewable energy 
targets? – Yes.”  (own translation, p. 2; 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 
n.d.). 
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Monitoring report regarding the Energiewende (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2016) 
Table 14. Linguistic analysis of the monitoring report regarding the Energiewende (own table) 
Data Analysis (inference from data) 
“The EEG is central management tool for the 
expansion of renewable energies” (own 
translation, p.19). 
The monitoring report is in line with the market 
solution approach presented in the sustainability 
strategy. But how the Energiewende is financed 
and that this financing is relying on a functional 
FS remains again unmentioned.  
“The market segment of renewable energy offers 
high start-up dynamics, especially due to young 
energy production companies. Furthermore it 
shows that the start-ups in this segment found 
with higher revenue levels and more employees 
[…] and need higher financing volume. […] The 
German federal ministry for economics supports 
start-ups with manifold measures, combined in 
the initiative “new founders’ period”. This entails 
also the networking between start-ups and 
established companies…” (own translation, p. 
124). 
Financial subsidies or governmental investments 
for the expansion of RE are only mentioned in 
connection with governmental support for 
energy research, although the government is 
aware of the need for investment. Suggested 
measures only focus on start-ups, support for 
already established companies is not considered. 
Secondly, this approach does not address higher 
investment costs or support, e.g. by establishing 
sustainable connections to the FS. 
“The government observed a decrease in 
investments in 2015. As the expansion of the 
renewable energies remained stable at the same 
time, the government follows: “This could be an 
indicator for reduced costs per installed plant. A 
reason could also be structural effects, i.e. 
increased installations of cheaper technologies” 
(own translation p.130). 
The weak modality (“could be x or could be y”) 
that is used indicates that the government is 
unsure about the cause of the decrease in 
investments. It is also not discussed, why the 
potential cost reduction did not lead to an 
increase in the expansion of RE facilities, but to a 
decrease in investments. The investors have no 
agency in this explanations and a connection to 
the development of companies and financial 
market is not made. 
 “Motor of the renewable expansion in the 
long term is the installation of wind energy 
and PV facilities” (own translation, p.15)  
 “The renewable energies increase their 
importance for the German power mix” 
(own translation, p.17) 
 “The EEG shall ensure that the expansion 
targets for renewable energy are met and 
bring cost efficiency of the further 
installation via competitive tenders. In this 
way it [the EEG] makes renewable energies 
fit for the power market” (own translation, 
p.17). 
The transition to RE is mainly presented in 
passive sentences without agency, which ignore 
the role of companies and the FS. 
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Appendix IV: Linguistic analysis DONG (DONG, 2017) 
Table 15. Linguistic analysis of DONG's annual report (own table) 
Data Analysis (inference from data) 
“The aim of our financing policy is to ensure the 
best possible loan arrangements, while also 
minimizing financing costs, liquidity and 
refinancing risks. The borrowing activities are 
diversified among various funding sources and 
maturities. In addition, we have robust financial 
resources.“ (p.130) 
The explanations about the financing policy 
remain broad and universal. Uncertainty arises 
from the formulation of “best possible loan 
arrangements”. What is seen as the “best” loan 
agreement depends significantly on the aims of 
the financing policy and the risk affinity of the 
management. DONG states some aims of the 
policy, however they partly conflict with each 
other (minimizing financing cost vs. liquidity and 
minimizing refinancing risk). The longer the 
maturity of liabilities, the higher the liquidity and 
the lower the refinancing risk. This is conflicting 
with the goal of minimizing funding costs, which 
are rising with increasing maturity. A goal 
prioritization is not given.  
The suggested measures of the financing policy 
are a diversification of funding sources and 
preservation of financial resources, both with 
limited effectiveness as shown in the structural 
analysis. The limitation of the resilience of asset 
prices financial crises is not problematized. 
Instead financial resources are misleadingly called 
“robust”, which indicated that financial resources 
remain stable when external shocks occur. A 
strong modality is used (“we have”) which 
presents the robustness as a given fact with 
unclear underlying assumptions.  
“Within the next couple of years we will likely 
have excess investment capacity […]. We will 
utilise the investment capacity to pursue value 
creating investment opportunities. Reducing 
our farm down activities may be an alternative 
or supplement to new investment opportunities 
[…]. However, if value creating investment 
opportunities do not absorb the excess 
investment capacity we will remain disciplined 
and return cash to shareholders.” (p.15) 
 
This passage is written in an optimistic tone about 
available investment capital. It is not specified 
under which conditions investment capacity will 
excess the needed amount or from which sources 
the capital stems. In the previous paragraph 
management states that it plans to increase 
dividends yearly, which means that potential 
investment capital from internal funding flows 
out of the company. This might increase the 
demand external capital. Nevertheless, the 
chance of excess investment capital is defined as 
“likely”. The term “absorb” brings the association 
of a whole flood of available investment capital. 
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This positive framing is supported by two 
concrete possibilities to use the capital surplus. 
The “however” of the last sentence puts it in 
contrast to the previous sentences, indicating that 
discipline is only needed if no investment 
opportunities can be identified. Otherwise 
management can less disciplined invest to create 
“value”. The quote is written from an 
instrumental rationality and economic 
perspective. Investment capital must be used to 
create value for the shareholders. It is assumed 
that the reader understands value in financial 
terms and profitability. Social or environmental 
values are excluded as possible ends of 
investments. No criteria to choose investments 
are mentioned.  
“Moreover, we are exposed to risks entailing a 
very small probability of having a considerable 
impact on the Group's finances and/or 
reputation. These include, among other things, 
a 1,000-year storm, fires at or collisions with 
offshore wind farms, damage to export cables 
due to anchors being dragged along the 
seabed, damage to pipes at the Nybro Gas 
Treatment Plant, power station breakdowns 
and the collapse of the financial markets.” (p. 
47) 
DONG categorizes the risk of a collapse of the 
financial markets as a risk that “entail[s] a very 
small probability of having a considerable impact 
on the Group's finances and/ or reputation.” 
(DONG, 2017, p. 47). As the assessed risk is low 
(“very small probability”, comparable to a 
“thousand year storm”), no risk mitigation 
measures are mentioned. The subjectivation of 
the risk, which “entail” a certain probability hides 
the risk assessment conducted by DONG to come 
to the conclusion that the risk is of low 
profitability and presents it rather as a fact than 
as an own assessment, which might result in a 
taken for granted assumption. This passage is the 
only concrete mentioning of the risk of a collapse 
of the financial markets, which leaves the risk 
understated. Notwithstanding the ambiguous 
financing policy and the insufficient addressing of 
the risk of a collapse of financial markets, DONG 
concludes prominently in the management’s 
overview: 
“In connection with our divestment of 50% of 
the Burbo Bank Extension and the Race Bank 
offshore wind farms in 2016, we again proved 
the viability of our partnership model to attract 
capital at the lowest possible cost.”(DONG, 
2017, p. 36) 
 
The quote is based on the assumption that the 
functioning of the “partnership model” in the past 
can be used as evidence for future viability. It is 
not investigated which conditions need to be 
fulfilled to ensure the viability of the model, e.g. 
attract private financial capital and sufficient 
liquidity in the FS. 
The purpose of the partnership model is to 
provide capital “at the lowest possible cost”. In 
the quote the partnership model is subjectified, 
deleting the agency of DONG’s management. 
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DONG’s management relieves itself from the 
responsibility to pick investors for the constructed 
wind farms. However, as the investors have 
decision making power, they determine the long-
term sustainability for the projects. The annual 
report has no traces of such considerations by 
DONG’s management. 
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Appendix V: Linguistic analysis EnBW 
Table 16. Linguistic analysis of EnBW's annual report (own table) 
Data Analysis (inference from data) 
“It is our goal over the next few years to once 
again progressively move from a phase of 
restructuring and saving to one of growth” (p.3) 
Like DONG EnBW follows a strategy of growth. 
“The aim [of the corporate strategy] is to 
develop a future-oriented EnBW that can 
remain robust even during the most difficult 
market conditions and concentrate to an even 
greater extent on innovation and growth” 
(p.35). 
EnBW aims to finance the growth and future 
investments with internal funds, although these 
funds are volatile, as shown in the recent 
annual report and strives for “low risk 
activities” by ensuring, amongst others, “a solid 
financial position” and a “conservative financial 
policy” (p. 56). 
Although it remains unclear to which market 
condition EnBW refers, all these quotes 
demonstrate a financially conservative business 
model, which is based on the limitation of 
investments to available internal funds. 
 
Similar to DONG, EnBW identified financial 
capital as one of the key resources for its 
business and breaks it down into equity, 
borrowed capital and positive cash flows. 
However, the “significant activities” taken into 
2016 to preserve the financial capital are all 
targeted onto external, borrowed capital by 
raising hybrid capital, redeeming a loan and 
getting a new credit line (p. 14). The first two 
identified main stakeholder groups of EnBW are 
“shareholders and the capital market” (p. 35) 
The strategy does not aim to mitigate general 
dependency upon the FS. Instead financial 
strategy is focused on maintaining the attractively 
for FS-stakeholders by maintaining an 
investment-grade rating. Purpose is to ensure 
access to the FS. This does not point to a general 
awareness of financial instability. 
“The key performance indicator internal 
financing capability […] represents the most 
significant performance indicator for the 
Group's ability to finance its activities internally 
[…]. The retained cash flow […] is available to 
the Group for net investment without the need 
to raise additional outside capital. (p.28) […] 
This new control mechanism will enable EnBW 
to retain its financial discipline independently of 
interest rate-related volatility. The goal is a 
solid investment-grade rating” (p. 25). 
It is clear that the goal of the financial strategy is 
to maintain a good rating, not to ensure a stable 
investment. The rating has the purpose to ensure 
access to capital markets to lowest capital costs: 
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“With a solid investment-grade rating, we want 
to: 
 offer reliable opportunities for financing 
partners 
 be regarded as a dependable business 
partner in our trading activities 
 achieve the lowest possible capital costs 
 implement an appropriate number of 
projects and thereby maintain the future 
viability of the company” (p. 56) 
 
Being attractive for financing partners and 
maintaining capital costs low is directly aiming to 
ensure appropriate external funding.  
The fact that emphasizing internal funding has 
mainly the purpose to ensure attractiveness for 
external investors suggests that the goal of 
internal funding is very unlikely result of 
instability awareness. The underlying assumption, 
however, seems to be that the FS is functional 
and EnBW’s task is to get attractive for external 
capital.  
 
“EnBW has sufficient and flexible access to the 
capital market at all times” (p.55) 
The functionality of capital markets is not 
questioned. 
 
“Value added in the Renewable Energies 
segment decreased in comparison to the 
previous year to € -95.9 million. […]. The ROCE 
[return on capital employed] for this segment 
was 4.3% with an unchanged weighted average 
cost of capital of 7.5%. (p. 63) 
Strong profitability and internal cash flow can be 
a solution to overcome the trade-off between the 
limitation of dependency upon the FS and 
investments. Having a strong profitability, 
however, is especially difficult in the highly 
complex and risk intensive field of offshore wind 
energy. 
 
To maintain an investment-grade rating, “EnBW 
aims to limit cash effective net investment to 
the level of the retained cash flow. This will 
ensure the company retains its high level of 
financial discipline” (p.75). 
It is not discussed that a limitation in investment 
might threaten the success of the Energiewende. 
Instead, the maintenance of a good rating is 
prioritized.  
 
“Financial management is responsible for […] 
optimisation of financing, as well as for 
guaranteeing a sufficient level of liquidity 
reserves.” (p. 54) “Main goals of the financial 
strategy are: (i) secure profitability (ii) high level 
of financial discipline expressed in the internal 
funding capability and (iii) raise the value of the 
group” (p. 26). 
EnBW’s financial management follows amongst 
others the goal to ensure liquidity. Similar to 
DONG a prioritization of the different goals is not 
given. 
“EnBW intends to invest €14.1 billion in total by 
2020 (based on the reference year of 2012). In 
this context, the focus will be placed on 
expanding renewable energies on an industrial 
scale. […] In order to obtain the financial 
To be able to finance investments with internal 
funds EnBW aims to draw liquidity from 
divestments. The strategy of divestment can only 
be successful, as long as (i) EnBW has assets to 
divest, which might not be given in the long-term 
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headroom required for such extensive 
investments, we have significantly extended our 
divestiture programme – involving conventional 
divestitures, cash inflow from participation 
models, the disposal of assets and subsidies” (p. 
24). […]  “In the future, we aim to achieve an 
internal financing capability of ≥ 100% each 
year by, for example, adjusting future 
participation models so that, in contrast to the 
EnBW Baltic 2 S.C.S. participation model, 
potential partners are already participating in 
the construction phase.” (p 59). 
and (ii) investors are available to buy the assets. 
Both conditions are not discussed. Instead, the 
passage puts the main agency on the 
management of EnBW “we have significantly 
extended our divestiture program”. This 
statement does not include the agency of the 
counterparties for the divestments and does 
therefore not discuss the underlying assumption 
of their investment capability. What happens, if 
the divestment is not successful, is not stated.  
The management concludes that “the 
company’s future solvency is secured by its solid 
financial position” (p. 59) 
 
This optimistic statement is structured as a fact, 
using a strong modality. The underlying 
assumptions are not stated and discussed. It is 
not questioned which impacts might arise from 
the strong structural dependency on the FS. 
 
EnBW’s identification of chances and risks is in accordance to the German law more extensive than 
the one of DONG. I will conduct an in-depth analysis of the identified chances and risks to identify 
potential traces of awareness: 
Table 17. Linguistic analysis of EnBW's chances and risks reporting (own table) 
Risks and Chances Awareness of risk originating from FS instabilities? 
Strategic risk in the 
participation model 
Low: “…uncertainties with respect to the realisation of 
reduced or surplus revenue, as well as to time delays for 
the completion of these transactions.” (p. 83)  
Possibility that investors are not available is not 
mentioned. 
Improvements in efficiency Low: “positive effect on the key performance indicator 
adjusted EBITDA and thus also on the key performance 
indicator internal financing capability” (p. 84). 
The increase of internal funding capability is mentioned 
as a positive side effect. 
EU sanctions against Russia No 
Legal risk  No 
Personnel risks No 
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Risks of health, safety, security 
and environment 
No 
Market prices of financial 
investments 
Medium: “The financial investments managed by the 
asset management system are exposed to price changes 
and other loss risks as a result of the volatile financial 
market environment […] If these risks lead to a significant 
or prolonged decline in the fair value of these assets, this 
must be recognised in the form of impairments […] In 
terms of the market prices for financial investments, we 
currently identify an equal level of opportunity and risk 
due to the increased volatility on the financial markets. 
Through corresponding effects, this could have both a 
positive and negative impact in 2017 and 2018 on net 
debt” (p. 85).  
EnBW identified the risk of volatility of asset prices, 
however this risk of severe systemic decline in asset 
prices and reduced liquidity in times of financial crisis. 
Instead effects on the profitability in form of impairment 
(reduction of accounted asset prices) are mentioned as 
main risk effect. 
Discount rate applied for 
pension provisions 
No 
Impairment risks (for equity 
investments) 
No 
Rating Low: “We identify a general risk that the rating agencies 
may downgrade the credit rating of EnBW if the 
economic and political conditions deteriorate further or 
EnBW cannot fulfil the expectations of the agencies” (p. 
85). 
Importance of the financial rating is identified, which is 
an indication for the importance of credit markets for 
EnBW. However, the identified dependency does not 
address the risk of instability, but only limited 
attractiveness of EnBW for investors. 
Compliance No 
 
